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JURISDICTION BY CROSS-REFERENCE 
LUMEN N. MULLIGAN
 
ABSTRACT 
State and federal law often cross-reference each other to provide a rule 
of decision. The difficulties attendant to these cross-referenced schemes 
are brought to the fore most clearly when a federal court must determine 
whether such bodies of law create federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, 
the federal courts have issued scores of seemingly inconsistent opinions on 
these cross-referential cases. In this Article, I offer an ordering principle 
for these apparently varied, cross-referential jurisdictional cases. I argue 
that the federal courts only take federal question jurisdiction over cross-
referenced claims when they, from a departmental perspective, maintain 
declaratory authority over the cross-referenced law. I defend this thesis by 
extensively exploring cross-referenced regimes in numerous modes. I also 
contend that this cross-referential ordering principle offers significant 
insights into the nature of federal question claims more generally. Namely, 
I assert that, contrary to the predominant view, the federal courts do not 
stand ready to hear cases in which the judiciary as a whole is deployed 
merely as a fact-finding forum under federal question jurisdiction. 
Further, I contend that this view of federal question jurisdiction comports 
with the original understanding of that font of jurisdiction, as well as 
principles of judicial independence, and that the Court’s tendency to vest 
federal question jurisdiction upon mere formal distinctions in these 
contexts often leads to separation-of-powers difficulties. As such, I 
advocate that jurisdiction over all cross-referenced regimes proceed on 
functionalist lines. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Although we often conceive of state and federal claims as distinct 
species, these animals have been interbreeding for some time. As a result, 
state law often cross-references federal law as the rule of decision and vice 
versa. While this cross-referencing creates quandaries of all stripes, these 
difficulties are perhaps most acute in those cases where a federal court 
must determine whether such cross-referenced regimes create federal 
question, as opposed to diversity, subject matter jurisdiction. This 
difficulty often leads to apparently inconsistent jurisprudence. For 
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example, state judicial incorporation of federal standards as the rule of 
decision, under Michigan v. Long,
1
 most often results in federal question 
jurisdiction, while state incorporation of a federal standard as an element 
of a state cause of action, in so-called hybrid actions, infrequently results 
in federal question jurisdiction.
2
 Federal incorporation of state law also 
produces equally divergent jurisdictional opinions. As Shoshone Mining 
Co. v. Rutter
3
 and attempts at enacting protective jurisdiction
4
 illustrate, 
Congress may not merely cross-reference state law and thereby create 
federal question jurisdiction; yet near analogous cross-referencing of state 
law as the rule of decision in the federal common law context
5
 results in 
federal question jurisdiction.
6
 Equally puzzling, the cross-referencing of 
state law under the Miller Act
7
 creates federal question jurisdiction,
8
 while 
the nearly identical use of state law under the Tucker Act
9
 does not.
10
 
Similarly inconsistent, the courts find that the incorporation of state law as 
the rule of decision in federal enclaves creates federal question 
jurisdiction,
11
 while near analogous incorporation of state standards into 
 
 
 1. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). 
 2. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–14 (2005). 
 3. 177 U.S. 505, 506–07 (1900). 
 4. See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 5. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (―[F]ederal courts 
should incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision unless application of the particular state law 
in question would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 6. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (―conclud[ing] that § 1331 jurisdiction 
will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of statutory origin‖). 
 7. 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–3134 (2006) (allowing subcontractors to recover on a bond put up by the 
prime government contractor). 
 8. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. M.J. Kelley Corp., 995 F.2d 656, 659 
(6th Cir. 1993) (―[A]ll federal district courts have jurisdiction over Miller Act claims, because they 
present a federal question.‖); Cont‘l Cas. Co. v. Allsop Lumber Co., 336 F.2d 445, 449 (8th Cir. 1964) 
(―The defense further argues that . . . federal court jurisdiction [lies in this Miller Act case] because it 
requires that the action be brought in the name of the United States . . . and that, therefore, no federal 
question is presented here. This defense argument may have some appeal but at this date it does not 
persuade us.‖). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (2006) (waiving sovereign immunity for contract claims 
against the United States by nonbonded contractors or claims of implied contract). 
 10. See, e.g., Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(―Contrary to Plaintiffs‘ assertions, where a case falls under Tucker Act jurisdiction, federal question 
jurisdiction cannot serve as an alternative basis for jurisdiction.‖); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United 
States, 901 F.2d 1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1990) (similar); A.E. Finley & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 
898 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1990) (similar); Graham v. Henegar, 640 F.2d 732, 734 & n.6 (5th Cir. 
Unit A Mar. 1981) (similar). Other circuits, however, do find 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction under the 
Tucker Act in some circumstances. See, e.g., W. Sec. Co. v. Derwinski, 937 F.2d 1276, 1280–81 (7th 
Cir. 1991); A.E. Finley & Assocs. v. United States, 898 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1990); Bor-Son 
Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 182 n.14 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 11. See, e.g., Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (―Federal 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1180 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1177 
 
 
 
 
federal law under the Federal Tort Claims Act
12
 does not create federal 
question jurisdiction.
13
 
These cross-referential puzzles have not escaped the academic eye. 
Scholars have explored extensively whether state common law cross-
references to federal law raise federal question jurisdiction,
14
 whether state 
constitutional cross-references to federal rules of decision present federal 
questions,
15
 whether Congress may enact so-called protective 
jurisdiction,
16
 and the like. By and large, however, these efforts have 
focused on only one type of cross-reference at a time, eschewing a 
treatment of cross-referencing writ large. I aim to tackle this broader 
project. 
In this Article, I offer an ordering principle for these cross-referential, 
jurisdictional cases—namely, that the federal courts only take federal 
question jurisdiction over cross-referenced claims when they, from a 
departmental perspective, maintain declaratory authority over the cross-
referenced law. By declaratory authority, I mean that the forum court is 
empowered to authoritatively establish the content of the cross-referenced 
law.
17
 Declaratory authority is to be contrasted, then, to those situations, 
 
 
courts have federal question jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on ‗federal enclaves.‘‖). 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (waiving sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United States 
and incorporating state law as the rule of decision). 
 13. See, e.g., CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2008); Ortiz v. United States, 595 
F.2d 65, 69 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 14. See, e.g., John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
145 (2006) (empirically surveying lower federal court practice in this area); Linda R. Hirshman, 
Whose Law is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed 
State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1985) (discussing the propriety of such hybrid law cases 
arising under § 1331); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 1781, 1786–93 (1998) (same); John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the 
Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1839–43 
(1998) (same); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction Over State Law 
Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2002) (same); see also infra note 179 (listing 
cases and articles on point). 
 15. See, e.g., Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114 (2009) 
(discussing federal question jurisdiction to address state-law questions); Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1934–47 (2003) (discussing the role of ―characterization‖ of law as state or 
federal in this context); Kermit Roosevelt III, Light From Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and 
Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2003) (discussing this question 
in the context of the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine); see also Martin H. Redish, 
Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. 
L. REV. 861 (1985) (arguing in favor of federal question jurisdiction for such cases only on certiorari); 
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 127 (1989) (similar). 
 16. See infra note 67 (listing scholarly treatment of protective jurisdiction). 
 17. See infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (further defining my use of declaratory 
authority). 
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like cases heard in diversity, in which the forum court lacks the power to 
authoritatively establish the content of the law at issue.
18
 I elucidate this 
principle by finding that cross-referencing regimes deploy cross-references 
of differing strengths. Under the taxonomy I advocate, a cross-reference 
may be mandatory, discretionary, or metadiscretionary. Deploying this 
classification scheme, I contend that the federal courts do not take federal 
question jurisdiction over cases in which Congress creates mandatory 
cross-references to state law. They only take federal question jurisdiction 
over cases in which the federal courts, from a departmental perspective, 
possess declaratory power over the question of law presented. State-law 
cross-references to federal law work in a mirror-like fashion, taking 
federal question jurisdiction only when the cross-reference is mandatory, 
but reach the same result of preserving federal declaratory authority.  
I further argue that this cross-referential ordering principle offers 
significant insights into the nature of federal question claims more 
generally. First, on judicial independence grounds, federal courts under 
federal question jurisdiction, contrary to the dominant view famously 
espoused by Professor Mishkin,
19
 do not stand ready to hear cases in 
which the judiciary as a whole is deployed merely as a fact-finding forum. 
Second, as these cross-referential cases lay bare, the Court‘s tendency is to 
vest federal question jurisdiction upon mere formal distinctions, which 
often leads to significant separation-of-powers difficulties.
20
 As such, I 
advocate that jurisdiction over all cross-referenced regimes proceed on 
functionalist lines. 
I begin, in Part II, by laying the analytical foundation for this 
discussion. I define the notion of cross-referencing with more precision 
and present the varying strengths with which a cross-reference may be 
made. With these tools at hand, in Part III, I establish my primary claim—
that the federal courts only take federal question jurisdiction over cross-
referenced cases in which they maintain declaratory authority. I proceed in 
this Part by categorizing jurisdictional rulings by strength of cross-
reference, addressing mandatory, discretionary, and metadiscretionary 
 
 
 18. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (further defining my use of lack of declaratory 
authority). 
 19. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 
167–74 (1953) (arguing that the federal courts in federal question jurisdiction should hear merely fact-
bound ―claims‖ even if all of the issues of federal law in the particular case are settled). 
 20. As Professor Vázquez recently noted, ―[i]t would be odd to say that federal jurisdiction 
would exist when Congress delegates to the courts the power to preempt some state law, but not when 
Congress itself specifies the extent of preemption.‖ Carlos M. Vázquez, The Federal “Claim” in the 
District Courts: Osborn, Verlinden, and Protective Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1731, 1761 (2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cross-references in turn. In so doing, I explore both federal cross-
references to state law and state-law cross-references to federal law. I 
contend that the federal courts routinely refuse federal question 
jurisdiction over congressional, mandatory cross-references to state law, 
yet will take jurisdiction over suits in which the courts make discretionary 
or metadiscretionary cross-references to state law. I further note that the 
federal courts will take federal question jurisdiction over state-law cross-
references to federal rules only when the cross-reference is 
nondiscretionary. Both practices, I contend, preserve the declaratory 
power of the federal courts over the cross-referenced legal question. 
In Part IV, I address the broader implications of this finding that the 
federal courts require declaratory power to vest federal question 
jurisdiction in cross-referential cases. First, I address how this requirement 
of declaratory power, which conforms to the original understanding of 
federal question jurisdiction and with norms of judicial independence, runs 
contrary to the predominantly held notion that federal courts should be 
open to purely fact-bound claims in federal question jurisdiction. Second, I 
critique the Court‘s overly formalistic reasoning in the cross-referenced 
context because it raises significant separation-of-powers concerns vis-à-
vis congressional control over federal court jurisdiction. I conclude by 
advocating for a functionalist perspective of cross-referenced regimes. 
While aiming to remain agnostic upon the propriety of any particular type 
of cross-referenced scheme, I argue that the courts should not vest federal 
question jurisdiction upon purely formalistic grounds and assume that the 
pragmatic ills of assumed extrajurisdictional approaches, such as 
protective jurisdiction, will be avoided.  
II. THE MIXING AND MATCHING OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
In this Part, I offer a more detailed explanation of the notions I deploy 
to analyze cross-referenced regimes. I begin with an exposition on how 
cross-referencing operates. I turn next to a classification of the varying 
strengths by which cross-references are made. With these tools at hand, in 
Part III, I turn to an investigation of federal question jurisdiction in the 
cross-referenced context. 
A. The Idea of Cross-Referencing 
To understand how cross-referencing works, one must take in the 
technical distinctions between the concepts of right and cause of action. At 
the common law, under the then-extant writ pleading system, the concepts 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/3
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of right and cause of action (or what is sometimes referred to as ―remedy‖ 
or a ―right of action‖) were thought to be immutably linked—one did not 
exist without the other.
21
 As Justice Harlan noted, ―contemporary modes 
of jurisprudential thought . . . appeared to link ‗rights‘ and ‗remedies‘ in a 
1:1 correlation . . . .‖22 Given this congruity, in times past the jurists would 
use the terms cause of action, right, and remedy interchangeably, 
especially in jurisdictional analyses.  
This traditional jurisprudence of congruity, however, had by the 1970s 
given way to a new regime,
23
 with the Court explicitly differentiating 
rights from the ability to enforce them by way of a cause of action.
24
 By 
the end of the decade, the Court in Davis v. Passman
25
 squarely held that 
the notions of right and cause of action constituted distinct analytic 
concepts.  
Under the now-prevailing view, a right is an obligation owed by the 
defendant to which the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary.
26
 Further, to 
qualify as a right, an obligation must be mandatory, not merely hortatory,
27
 
and the language at issue must not be ―too vague and amorphous‖ or 
 
 
 21. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 783 
(2004) (―At the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of action 
was generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in equity 
afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance.‖); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of 
Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71–83 (2001) (describing the 
traditional approach to rights, causes of action, and remedies). 
 22. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 401 
n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Zeigler, supra note 21, at 72 (―[C]ourts did not view a 
cause of action as a separate procedural entity, independent of a right and remedy, that had to be 
present for an action to go forward.‖).  
 23. Zeigler, supra note 21, at 83–104. Zeigler notes this as a sea change. But see Laura S. 
Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1241–45 (2001) (noting how the 
two-track approach has developed over many decades). 
 24. Zeigler, supra note 21, at 85–86; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 74–85 (1975) (noting 
that the corporate action in question was in violation of a federal criminal statute but questioning 
whether plaintiffs had a cause of action to privately enforce the prohibition); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. 
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420–23 (1975) (acknowledging that the Securities Investor Protection Act 
grants plaintiffs beneficial rights but questions whether they have a cause of action to force the agency 
to enforce them); Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457–58 
(1974) (acknowledging the existence of rights and duties under the Amtrak Act but questioning 
whether respondent had a cause of action to enforce them). 
 25. 442 U.S. 228, 238–39 (1979). 
 26. Id. (distinguishing rights from causes of actions and holding that, as in Barbour, being an 
intended beneficiary of a statute may create rights even if it does not a create a cause of action); id. at 
241 (construing rights as obligations designed to benefit individuals, even if the right holder lacks a 
cause of action to enforce them). 
 27. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (finding that provisions of 
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ―were intended to be hortatory, not 
mandatory‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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―beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.‖28 This three-part test 
(i.e., mandatory obligation, clear statement, and enforceability)
29
 remains 
the standard by which the Court determines when a right exists.
30
 
A cause of action is the distinct determination of whether the plaintiff 
falls into a class of litigants empowered to enforce a specified right in 
court.
31
 The concept of cause of action, then, is necessarily related to the 
concept of a right insofar as plaintiffs must have rights before they can be 
persons empowered to enforce them. But the concept of cause is not the 
equivalent of a right itself under the contemporary view. Indeed, one may 
have a right, yet lack the power to enforce the right. For example, an 
individual‘s rights under certain statutory schemes may only be vindicated 
by an administrative agency—not by the individuals themselves.32 That is 
to say, Congress may vest individuals with rights but not vest them with 
causes of action to enforce those rights by way of a private suit.  
These distinctions between rights and causes of action arise frequently 
in the cross-referencing context. State and federal law may cross-reference 
each other in three contexts.
33
 First, state statutes may directly incorporate 
 
 
 28. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987). 
 29. This last prong is, or nearly is, identical to the concept of remedy. But whether a court can 
issue an effective remedy is best understood as a matter of standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (discussing redressability). Including redressability in the rights 
analysis is double counting at best. A more troubling result could be the collapsing of the distinction 
between rights and remedy, as this final statement appears to incorporate redressability as part of the 
rights analysis. Given that the Court has consistently striven since the 1970s to distinguish between 
rights and remedies, see Zeigler, supra note 21, at 83–104 (criticizing this jurisprudential move), 
however, it would be a disservice to read this collapse into this Article‘s jurisdictional analysis unless 
it is absolutely necessary. I will, thus, focus on the notions of mandatory obligation and clear 
statement. 
 30. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); see also Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (discussing three-part test); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 
107, 132–33 (1994) (same); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (same); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. 
Ass‘n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (same). 
 31. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979); see also id. at 240 n.18 (A ―cause of action is a 
question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of 
law, appropriately invoke the power of the court . . . .‖). 
 32. See, e.g., Nat‘l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457 
(1974) (holding that power to vindicate rights rests with the Attorney General); see also Passman, 442 
U.S. at 241 (―For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regulatory 
schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private causes of action, they may nevertheless be 
enforced through alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, or other public causes of 
actions.‖ (citations omitted)). 
 33. See Preis, supra note 14, at 159–61 (noting three ways by which such cross-referenced 
claims may enter federal court); Redish, supra note 15, at 899–900 (noting four ways in which federal 
law finds its way into state court; the first means, the joinder of a federal claim to a state claim, is not a 
cross-reference and hence not relevant here). In a mild variation from Professors Preis and Redish, I 
am treating common law cross-referencing and statutory cross-referencing as distinct categories. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/3
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federal rights as an element of the state-law causes of action,
34
 or a federal 
statute may incorporate state law as the substantive right for certain federal 
causes of actions.
35
 Second, the courts may construe state constitutional 
rights, which are nominally independent of federal law, as consistent with 
federal interpretations of analogous federal rights.
36
 Similarly, the federal 
courts at times interpret the federal constitution as cross-referencing state-
law rights and causes of action.
37
 And third, in common-law claims, state 
common law may provide plaintiffs with a cause of action, in a manner 
akin to negligence per se or breach of contract, for the violation of a 
federal right that lacks a federal cause of action.
38
 Similarly, federal 
common law causes of action often incorporate state-law rights as the rule 
of decision.
39
  
One could arguably expand the universe of cross-referenced regimes 
even farther, but for various reasons I choose not to do so here. First, I do 
not include federal preemption as a species of cross-referencing, even 
when the preemption vests federal question jurisdiction over an otherwise 
state-law claim, because in such instances there is no attempt to 
incorporate state law as a part of federal law.
40
 As a result, in preemption 
cases, it is the federal right, in the procedural posture of a defense, that 
provides the basis for federal question jurisdiction.
41
 Similarly, I do not 
treat federal claims brought in state court as a matter of concurrent 
jurisdiction as examples of cross-referencing because such instances do 
not find state law incorporating federal regimes, but rather state courts 
applying federal regimes. Finally, I do not address the Rules of Decision 
 
 
 34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1(a)(3) (West 2006) (―‗Full and equal access,‘ for purposes of 
this section in its application to transportation, means access that meets the standards of Titles II and 
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) . . . .‖ ); see also infra notes 
176, 244 (providing more examples). 
 35. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a prime example. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 36. See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996) (―This court has consistently 
construed the federal and state equal protection clauses identically and considered claims arising under 
their scope as one issue.‖). 
 37. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing enclave jurisdiction). 
 38. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 39. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (holding that state law 
is presumed to provide the rule of decision in federal common law cases). 
 40. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006) (granting removal jurisdiction for federal officer 
defendants with a federal-law defense to a state-law action); 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (creating a 
foreign sovereign jurisdictional defense to state-law actions subject to exceptions in § 1605); see also 
infra note 146 (discussing the treatment of sovereign immunity as a ―jurisdictional defense‖). 
 41. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (holding that 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–11 
(2006), takes jurisdiction as a federal question, even over state law actions, because the immunity 
defense will necessarily arise in every such suit). 
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Act, which requires the federal courts to apply state law in all cases 
excepting those in which federal law specifically applies.
42
 This Article‘s 
focus is on the scope of federal question jurisdiction. Although the Act 
may apply to cases heard in federal question jurisdiction,
43
 it is seldom 
referenced in this context, excepting issues arising in pendent 
jurisdiction.
44
 
B. Cross-Referencing with Varying Degrees of Force 
These three modes of cross-referencing—statutory, constitutional, and 
common law—are each susceptible to three strengths of incorporation.45 In 
the first category of cases, cross-referenced law governs in the forum court 
of necessity because some rule of law renders the issue beyond the 
lawmaking competence of the forum court.
46
 Put differently, when a rule 
of law is applied by a mandatory cross-reference, the forum court lacks 
declaratory power over the content of the cross-referenced rule.
47
 The 
archetypal example of state law applying in a mandatory fashion in federal 
court (although not in the cross-referenced context) is the use of state law 
under the Erie doctrine.
48
 I label this type of cross-referencing 
―mandatory.‖  
There is an important caveat applicable here for federal, mandatory 
cross-references to state law. Although I label this category of cross-
references mandatory, this does not mean state law would apply über 
alles. As with the Erie doctrine in diversity cases, all cases of mandatory 
cross-references to state law are subject to federal-interest preemption. If a 
cross-referential application of state law would conflict with the 
Constitution, a federal statute,
49
 or important federal interests,
50
 federal 
 
 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 43. See Watson v. McCabe, 527 F.2d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that the Rules of 
Decision Act is not limited to any particular font of jurisdiction). 
 44. See Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 2004–06 (1991) (noting that 
the Act‘s scope reaches federal question jurisdiction, but that the presence of federal law on point in 
this font of jurisdiction, excepting pendent claims, limits its use). 
 45. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the 
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798–804 (1957) (providing 
definitive discussion of this topic); see also United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 
580, 591–94 (1973) (citing Mishkin and adopting his dichotomy). Mishkin is speaking only to state 
law in federal court, Mishkin, supra, at 798–804, while I am expanding the concept to include federal 
law in state court.  
 46. Mishkin, supra note 45, at 799. 
 47. See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 591; Mishkin, supra note 45, at 799. 
 49. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (―Except in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of 
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law properly preempts a cross-reference to state law even in a 
―mandatory‖ setting. Thus, a mandatory cross-reference is one in which 
the forum court lacks the power to deviate from the cross-referenced law 
unless it is preempted. Another unique feature of federal, mandatory cross-
references to state law is that in mandatory cross-referenced settings, the 
state law to be applied is that of the state in which the federal district sits, 
as opposed to a cross-reference to the general common law or the like.
51
 
The two remaining categories of cross-reference both involve some 
element of judicial choice. In the second category, cross-referenced state 
law governs in federal court, and analogously cross-referenced federal law 
governs in state court, because it was incorporated into the forum court‘s 
law interstitially as a matter of judicial discretion.
52
 In these cases then, the 
forum court possesses the judicial competence to choose a rule of decision 
and in exercising this power adopts the cross-referenced law as a matter of 
discretion.
53
 In other words, in such instances the forum court is 
empowered to declare the content of the cross-referenced law.
54
 I label 
these cross-references ―discretionary.‖  
The last category is composed of instances, like discretionary cross-
references, where state or federal law is cross-referenced as a matter of 
judicial discretion, but the incorporation is systemic and pervasive—not 
interstitial. Such is the case, for example, when state courts link a state 
constitutional provision permanently and inextricably to the federal 
analysis of an analogous provision.
55
 Such a cross-reference is not 
coextensive with mandatory cross-references, because in these cases the 
lack of declaratory power to deviate from the cross-referenced law is not 
imposed by a nonjudicial body.
56
 Yet, in all other respects, the forum court 
 
 
the State.‖). 
 50. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (holding that 
federal interest preempts state law in an Erie case); see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal 
Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1665 (2008).  
 51. See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 52. Mishkin, supra note 45, at 799–800. 
 53. Id. at 802; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER‘S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 627 
(6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER] (deploying the competency and discretion 
terminology). 
 54. See infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996) (―This court has consistently 
construed the federal and state equal protection clauses identically and considered claims arising under 
their scope as one issue.‖). 
 56. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (―Individual States may surely 
construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does 
the Federal Constitution.‖); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that a 
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treats the cross-reference as if it were a mandatory one.
57
 In these 
instances, the courts systemically cross-reference the law at issue unless 
preempted, and in the case of federal cross-references to state-law rights, 
the forum state supplies the sole source of the cross-referenced law. Thus, 
in these instances, there was a moment of discretion, perhaps best 
described as metadiscretion, characteristic of discretionary cases, followed 
by a practice of no discretion, characteristic of mandatory cases. I, 
therefore, label these cross-references ―metadiscretionary.‖ 
At first blush, these distinctions between mandatory or discretionary 
cross-references may seem of purely pedantic interest. Indeed, the Court 
has so opined on occasion.
58
 Professor Young, however, in a recent article 
convincingly argues to the contrary, providing three consequences that rest 
upon these distinctions.
59
 First, in mandatory applications of state law, 
federal courts remain bound by state court interpretation of state law (i.e., 
the federal courts lack declaratory power).
60
 His second point is the mirror 
image, noting that in discretionary cross-references to state law, the federal 
courts are free to declare the content of state law unfettered by state court 
rulings.
61
 And third, Professor Young argues that in discretionary cross-
 
 
state possesses a ―sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive 
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution‖). 
 57. Professor Young refers to this distinction as the ―repeat application problem.‖ Young, supra 
note 50, at 1646–48. He argues that the federal courts are prohibited from making a federal common 
law rule that deploys, what I term, a metadiscretionary selection of state-law rights. Id. at 1650. While 
remaining agnostic on this question for now, I seek to deploy this concept of ―one-shot‖ discretion 
more broadly than federal common law, noting its use in enclave jurisdiction and in Michigan v. 
Long– type cases. 
 58. See, e.g., O‘Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (―The issue in the present 
case is whether the California rule of decision is to be applied to the issue of imputation or displaced, 
and if it is applied it is of only theoretical interest whether the basis for that application is California‘s 
own sovereign power or federal adoption of California‘s disposition.‖); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 
487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988). 
We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the 
displacement of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. Some of our cases 
appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed 
by federal law, with federal law deigning to borrow or incorporate or adopt state law except 
where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. We see nothing to be gained by 
expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect, and so 
adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and 
displacement of federal law‘s incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it 
at least does not do so in the present case. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Young, supra note 50, at 1651 (rejecting the position advanced in Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 
n.3). 
 60. Young, supra note 50, at 1651 
 61. Id. 
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references to state law, the federal courts are free to apply the law of any 
state, not just the law of the state in which the federal district court sits.
62
  
In this Article, I aim to make a fourth and broader point: namely, that 
this distinction between strengths of cross-references has jurisdictional 
consequences. That is to say, not only does mandatory cross-referencing 
of state law in federal-court cases bring important substantive results,
63
 
mandatory cross-references to state-law rights will not support federal 
question jurisdiction in federal court.
64
 Similarly, I argue that discretionary 
cross-referencing of federal rights into state-law causes of action will not 
support federal question jurisdiction, because the federal courts lack 
declaratory authority over the legal issues presented when these types of 
cross-references are deployed. 
III. CROSS-REFERENCING AND DECLARATORY POWER 
I turn now to making the case that the federal courts hear cross-
referenced claims in federal question jurisdiction only when the courts, at 
least from a departmental perspective, retain declaratory authority over the 
issue of substantive rights, as opposed to a mere cause of action. In so 
doing, I look first to mandatory cross-references, concluding that the 
federal courts refuse federal question jurisdiction over congressionally 
mandated cross-references to state law rights (i.e., cases where the federal 
courts would lack declaratory authority over the right), yet accept federal 
question jurisdiction over mandatory state-law cross-references to federal 
rights (i.e., cases in which the federal courts possess declaratory 
authority). I then explore discretionary cross-references, where I find the 
mirror-image phenomenon. The federal courts find federal question 
jurisdiction when federal law renders a discretionary cross-reference to 
state-law rights, yet they decline federal question jurisdiction when state 
law discretionarily cross-references federal rights. Finally, I assert that in 
the metadiscretionary context, the Court breaks with these symmetrical 
results, yet it takes federal question jurisdiction in a fashion that 
 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (exemplifying Mishkin‘s category 
one cases, holding the federal courts incapable of applying federal substantive law in diversity cases), 
with Dzikowski v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A. (In re Prudential of Fla. Leasing, Inc.), 478 F.3d 1291, 
1298 (11th Cir. 2007) (in a category two case construing gaps in 11 U.S.C. § 550(d), noting that state 
law is presumed to apply but nevertheless exercising the court‘s power to fashion a uniform federal 
rule of decision). 
 64. To be clear, my point is not that mandatory applications of state law can vest federal 
jurisdiction of any stripe. Such usage of federal law arises in diversity jurisdiction, cases in which the 
United States is a party, etc. My point is limited to vesting federal question jurisdiction. 
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maximizes federal judicial authority to declare the content of the cross-
referenced rights. The following table displays this new taxonomy: 
 
 FEDERAL LAW CROSS-REFERENCE TO 
STATE LAW 
STATE LAW CROSS-REFERENCE TO 
FEDERAL LAW 
MANDATORY 
CROSS-REFERENCE 
No Federal Court Declaratory Power  
No Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Examples 
 Protective Jurisdiction 
 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter 
 
Federal Court Declaratory Power  
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Examples 
 California‘s ADA 
 Hybrid (e.g., Grable & Sons) 
META-
DISCRETIONARY 
CROSS-REFERENCE 
Federal Court Declaratory Power  
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Examples 
 Enclave Jurisdiction 
 Federal Common Law Type II 
Federal Court Declaratory Power  
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Example 
 Michigan v. Long Presumption  
 
DISCRETIONARY 
CROSS-REFERENCE 
Federal Court Declaratory Power  
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Examples 
 Tucker Act  
 Miller Act 
 Federal Common Law Type I 
 
No Federal Court Declaratory Power  
No Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Examples 
 Michigan v. Long Plain Statement  
 State analogues to FED. R. CIV. P. 
 
 
A. Mandatory Cross-References 
In this section, I review the Court‘s jurisdictional treatment of 
mandatory cross-referencing regimes. A mandatory cross-reference, recall, 
is one in which the forum court is constrained to apply the cross-
referenced law by a nonjudicially imposed rule, unless the cross-
referenced law is preempted.
65
 I begin with congressionally mandated 
cross-references to state-law rights under the guise of protective and 
Shoshone-style jurisdiction, contending that the Court routinely rejects 
federal question jurisdiction here unless the cross-reference to state-law 
rights is subject to a federal defense. I then turn to state-law mandatory 
incorporation of federal rights, concluding that the federal courts take 
federal question jurisdiction to hear such claims. I further conclude that 
this taking of federal question jurisdiction maps directly onto the courts‘ 
ability to declare the content of the cross-referenced law at issue. 
 
 
 65. See supra Part II.B (defining mandatory cross-references). 
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1. Protective Jurisdiction  
I begin my review of federal question jurisdiction over congressionally 
mandated cross-references to state law with protective jurisdiction. 
Protective jurisdiction is a classification of jurisdictional statutes
66
 
encompassing any number of congressional attempts to deploy Article III 
federal question jurisdiction to authorize the federal courts to hear (a) 
state-law causes of action, (b) coupled with state-law rights, (c) absent a 
federal defense, (d) between nondiverse parties, (e) without falling into 
jurisdiction that is supplemental to a valid federal claim.
67
 Although 
scholars have put many glosses upon the notion of protective jurisdiction, 
the unifying theme is the idea that a protective jurisdictional statute would 
allow federal courts to hear these nondiverse, state-law claims and also 
satisfy Article III federal question jurisdiction because the jurisdictional 
statute itself provides the necessary federal ―ingredient‖ under Osborn v. 
Bank of the United States.
68
 The proposed justification for such a power 
rests upon a greater-power-includes-the-lesser-power argument. That is, if 
Congress has the greater power to preempt state law with substantive 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006) 
(potentially creating jurisdiction over state-law claims in the absence of diversity); Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (potentially creating 
jurisdiction over state-law claims in the absence of diversity). 
 67. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 542, 549–50 (1983) (defining protective jurisdiction). There are two leading theories of 
protective jurisdiction. First, we have Professor Mishkin‘s, in which he contends that Congress may 
vest jurisdiction over state-law claims if done as part of a broader federal program. Mishkin, supra 
note 19, at 195–96. Second, we have Professor Wechsler, who contends that so long as Congress could 
preempt state law by substantive legislation pursuant to Article I, it may deploy the lesser power to 
vest federal jurisdiction over state-law claims. Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the 
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25 (1948). In this piece, I need 
not dip too deeply into the debates swirling around protective jurisdiction. For those seeking more 
information, there is a wealth of literature here. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, supra; James E. Pfander, 
The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1926 
(2004); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389 
(2010); Vázquez, supra note 20; Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign 
Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2007); Scott A. Rosenberg, 
Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982). 
 68. 22 U.S. 738, 822–23 (1824); see also Nat‘l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 
582, 599 (1949) (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (advancing a protective jurisdiction theory and noting 
that ―[t]he only way in which any law of the United States contributed to the case was in opening the 
district courts to the trustee, under Art. I powers of Congress, just as the present statute, under the 
same Article, opens those courts to residents of the District of Columbia‖); Goldberg-Ambrose, supra 
note 67, at 546–47 (―The concept of protective jurisdiction tends to arise in situations in which 
Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted minimum requirements for a case to arise under 
federal law are not met, and no other basis for federal jurisdiction can be found under Article III of the 
Constitution.‖). 
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federal law, either standing alone or as part of an overarching federal 
regulatory project,
69
 then Congress has the lesser power, so the argument 
goes, to avoid preemption by merely assigning state law claims to federal 
jurisdiction.
70
 
Protective jurisdiction, then, is a classic example of federal law cross-
referencing state law. Indeed, pursuant to this basic notion of protective 
jurisdiction, should a case arise in protective jurisdiction, the applicable 
federal statute would require that the claim be governed under state law.
71
 
Moreover, such a deployment of state law would function as a mandatory 
cross-reference, as the courts would lack the discretion to deviate from the 
application of state law.
72
 Indeed, several Justices have noted that the 
application of state law in protective jurisdiction cases would be governed 
under an Erie-doctrine-like, choice-of-law regime mandating application 
of the law of the forum state.
73
 Recall, under the Erie doctrine, the federal 
courts lack declaratory authority over state law.
74
 Thus, protective 
jurisdiction, cast into the analytical components employed here, is a 
federal, statutory, mandatory cross-reference of both state-law rights and 
causes of action, which seeks to arise in federal court under federal 
question jurisdiction. 
Although protective jurisdiction has often attracted academic 
supporters,
75
 this jurisdictional-statute-only view has failed to accrue much 
 
 
 69. See Mishkin, supra note 19, at 157–60. 
 70. See Wechsler, supra note 67, at 224–25. 
 71. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (protective jurisdiction would involve only 
state law); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton, J., 
concurring) (advancing a protective jurisdiction theory and noting that ―I do not subscribe to the 
conclusion of the Court that the substantive law to be applied in a suit under § 301 is federal law‖); id. 
at 476 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (assuming that state law would govern in protective jurisdiction 
cases pursuant to the Mishkin and Wechsler theories); Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 596–97 (Jackson, J., 
plurality opinion) (proposing that the courts may constitutionally take jurisdiction under what 
contemporary scholars would style a protective jurisdictional theory because the ―Beeler and Austrian 
cases . . . [held] that the Congress had power to confer on the district courts jurisdiction of nondiversity 
suits involving only state law questions‖). 
 72. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 469–70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―Since I do not agree with 
the Court‘s conclusion that federal substantive law is to govern in actions under § 301, I am forced to 
consider . . . the constitutionality of a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over contracts that came 
into being entirely by virtue of state substantive law, a jurisdiction not based on diversity of 
citizenship, yet one in which a federal court would, as in diversity cases, act in effect merely as another 
court of the State in which it sits.‖); supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (defining mandatory 
use of state law). 
 73. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 608 & n.6 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (noting that, under Justice 
Jackson‘s protective jurisdiction view, choice of law would be governed under Erie doctrine); id. at 
650–51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (similar). 
 74. See, e.g., Comm‘r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (holding that the federal 
courts are bound by the state-law opinions of the state supreme courts in Erie cases). 
 75. See supra note 67. 
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case law authority. First, all agree that § 1331 is not susceptible to a 
protective jurisdiction interpretation.
76
 In 1875, Congress passed the first 
general grant of federal question jurisdiction now codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.
77
 Even though the language of § 1331 parallels that of Article III 
of the Constitution, the Court interprets § 1331 as granting a much 
narrower scope of federal question jurisdiction than the Constitution 
permits.
78
 As a result, all § 1331 jurisdictional cases are subject to the 
well-pleaded complaint rule.
79
 Following this rule, only federal issues 
raised in a plaintiff‘s complaint, not anticipated defenses, establish federal 
question jurisdiction.
80
 Moreover, the majority of federal question cases,
81
 
according to this standard view, meet § 1331‘s well-pleaded complaint 
requirement because federal law creates the plaintiff‘s cause of action.82 
This position is generally referred to as the Holmes test. A cross-reference 
to state-law causes of action and state-law rights fails to comport with the 
Holmes test because the cause of action is not federal. Thus, if Congress 
 
 
 76. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 
1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (―The theory of protective jurisdiction applies only 
within the context of a special jurisdictional statute; no one has ever argued that section 1331 itself 
amounts to a grant of jurisdiction to entertain state law claims on particular matters of federal 
concern.‖). 
 77. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). 
This statute has not always been codified here. Nevertheless, I do not employ the cumbersome 
―predecessor statute to § 1331‖ locution when referring to cases dealing with the Act as codified in a 
different location. Instead, I simply refer to this Act as § 1331, even if at a previous time it was 
codified at a different location. This approach is sound as, excepting statutory amounts in controversy, 
the Act has been essentially unchanged since 1875. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 
94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (striking out the minimum amount in controversy requirement of $10,000); Act of 
July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the minimum amount in controversy 
requirement from $3,000 to $10,000). Finally, following most scholars, I exclude the short-lived 
general grant of federal question jurisdiction passed at the end of President John Adams‘s term and 
treat the 1875 Act as the first general federal question grant. 
 78. Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983). The Constitution 
prescribes the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
As a matter of constitutional law, the scope of federal question jurisdiction, jurisdiction ―arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,‖ id., is quite broad. See Osborn v. Bank of the 
U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–23 (1824) (holding that any federal ―ingredient‖ is sufficient to 
satisfy the Constitution‘s federal question jurisdiction parameters). Despite this broad constitutional 
scope, the Constitution is not self-executing in this regard. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 
478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).  
 79. Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded 
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599 
(1987). 
 80. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the rule). 
 81. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808. 
 82. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (―A suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.‖).  
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wishes to pursue a protective jurisdictional theory of jurisdiction, it must 
pass a statute auxiliary to § 1331.
83
  
As to Article III federal question jurisdiction, protective jurisdiction 
has failed to find broad support at the Court. As a matter of constitutional 
law, the scope of federal question jurisdiction—jurisdiction ―arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States‖84 as embodied in 
Article III—is quite broad.85 Famously, Chief Justice Marshall wrote for 
the Court in Osborn that the existence of any federal ―ingredient‖ in a case 
is sufficient to satisfy Article III federal question jurisdiction.
86
 Under the 
conventional reading of the ingredient test, Article III jurisdiction lies so 
long as it is possible, even if not probable, that a question of federal law 
will arise at some point during the suit.
87
 In Osborn itself, the federally 
chartered status of the bank provided the necessary federal ingredient to 
vest Article III jurisdiction.
88
  
Although Professor Mishkin traces protective jurisdiction to Osborn,
89
 
most commentators place Justice Jackson‘s plurality opinion in National 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
90
 in which he offered a 
 
 
 83. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton, 
J., concurring) (treating § 301 of the LMRA as a protective jurisdiction statute). 
 84. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 85. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–23 (1824) (holding that any 
federal ―ingredient‖ is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution‘s federal question jurisdiction parameters). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1983); MARTIN 
H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 86 (2d ed. 
1990). 
 88. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 822–23. Two other competing interpretations of Osborn are prominent as 
well. Professor Mishkin argues that Osborn sanctions the theory of protective jurisdiction, the view 
that a mere federal jurisdictional statute provides a sufficient federal ingredient to vest Article III 
jurisdiction over state-law rights coupled with a state-law cause of action when part of an overarching 
federal program. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 187–89. Professor Bellia, in two powerful pieces, offers a 
third interpretation. Bellia, supra note 21, at 800–12 (2004) (arguing that Article III is best interpreted 
in light of writ-pleading concepts and that this insight produces important ramifications for 
understanding Article III federal question jurisdiction under Osborn, standing doctrine, and inferred-
cause-of-action doctrine); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” 
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 332–40 (2007). He contends that, from an originalist perspective, 
Article III federal question jurisdiction must be understood within the context of common law writ 
pleading prevalent at the country‘s founding. Bellia, supra note 21, at 802 (―By ‗ingredient,‘ Marshall 
did not mean something that might arise in connection with the litigation of a cause of action, but 
rather an essential component of a cause of action.‖). Professor Bellia argues that federal corporate 
status was an ―ingredient‖ in Osborn because, under common law writ pleading, the bank would have 
to plead its capacity to sue or be sued, a question of federal law, in every case to which it was a party. 
Id. at 804–05 (At common law, ―if the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts in the bill demonstrating 
a right to institute the proceeding, the defendant could demur. . . . And it was the federal law defining 
the Bank‘s capacities that established those facts.‖). 
 89. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 187–89. 
 90. 337 U.S. 582 (1949). 
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species of protective jurisdiction
91
 as the basis for taking jurisdiction over 
state-law claims between nonconstitutionally diverse citizens,
92
 as the first 
judicial support for protective jurisdiction. The other six Justices in 
Tidewater, however, dissented from Justice Jackson‘s view, arguing that a 
mere jurisdictional statute is not a sufficient federal ingredient to vest 
Article III federal question jurisdiction.
93
  
Similarly, in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama,
94
 the Court faced the question of taking federal jurisdiction over 
contract claims under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act.
95
 The Court‘s majority opinion claimed to avoid the protective 
jurisdiction issue by holding that section 301 authorized the creation of 
federal common law, thus ostensibly providing a basis for federal question 
jurisdiction.
96
 Two members of the Court, however, opined that federal 
question jurisdiction lay under a protective jurisdiction theory.
97
 Justice 
Frankfurter vigorously objected, arguing that such jurisdiction lacked any 
federal ingredient, but rather manifested a constitutionally impermissible 
distrust of state courts
98
 and emasculated the jurisdictional limits of Article 
 
 
 91. Id. at 588–600 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (arguing, akin to Professor Wechsler, that 
because Congress has the Article I power to govern the District of Columbia, it has the power to vest 
federal jurisdiction over state-law claims involving District of Columbia citizens). 
 92. In question in Tidewater was whether Article III supported jurisdiction over a state-law claim 
between a citizen of Maryland and a citizen of the District of Columbia. Id. at 583. Such an action is 
prima facie not supportable under diversity jurisdiction because the District of Columbia is not a state 
nor is it a foreign nation, the statuses required by diversity. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (―The judicial 
Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . . and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.‖). 
 93. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring, joined by Murphy, J.) (―The opinion of 
Mr. Justice Jackson . . . . finds that Congress has power to add to the Article III jurisdiction of federal 
district courts such further jurisdiction as Congress may think ‗necessary and proper,‘ Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 18, to implement its power of ‗exclusive Legislation,‘ Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, over the 
District of Columbia . . . . From this reasoning I dissent.‖); id. at 626 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting, joined 
by Douglas, J.) (―I agree with the views expressed by . . . Mr. Justice Rutledge which relate to the 
power of Congress under Art. I of the Constitution to vest federal district courts with jurisdiction over 
suits between citizens of States and the District of Columbia . . . .‖); id. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting, joined by Reed, J.) (same). 
 94. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 95. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). 
 96. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456–57. 
 97. Id. at 460 (Burton, J., concurring, joined by Harlan, J.) (―I agree with Judge Magruder in 
International Brotherhood v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, that some federal rights may necessarily 
be involved in a § 301 case, and hence that the constitutionality of § 301 can be upheld as a 
congressional grant to Federal District Courts of what has been called ‗protective jurisdiction.‘‖). 
 98. Id. at 474–75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (―‗Protective jurisdiction,‘ once the label is 
discarded, cannot be justified under any view of the allowable scope to be given to Article III. . . . 
‗Protective jurisdiction‘ cannot generate an independent source for adjudication outside of the Article 
III sanctions and what Congress has defined. The theory must have as its sole justification a belief in 
the inadequacy of state tribunals in determining state law. The Constitution reflects such a belief in the 
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III.
99
 Moreover, protective jurisdiction has fared poorly in more recent 
cases, garnering only two votes of support from the members of the Court 
in the last twenty years.
100
  
Despite academic support, the Court has never adopted the theory as a 
holding.
101
 Indeed, most members of the Court consider protective 
jurisdiction an archetypal overextension of federal question jurisdiction.
102
 
Pursuant to this view, then, a federal, statutory, mandatory cross-reference 
of both a state-law right and cause of action—with its concomitant 
commitment to an Erie-like choice of law regime in which the federal 
courts lack declaratory authority over substantive law—will not support 
Article III federal question jurisdiction. 
2. Shoshone-Style Cross-References 
In addition to congressional attempts to enact mandatory cross-
references to state-law rights and causes of action, Congress has on 
occasion sought to create federal question jurisdiction over statutory 
claims containing a federal cause of action coupled with a mandatory 
cross-reference to a state-law right. Although a straightforward application 
of the Holmes test would find federal question jurisdiction in such cases, 
due to the federal origin of the cause of action, the Court has declined to 
take § 1331 jurisdiction over such cases. Again we find this refusal to take 
 
 
specific situation within which the Diversity Clause was confined. The intention to remedy such 
supposed defects was exhausted in this provision of Article III.‖). 
 99. Id. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 100. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 435, 436 & n.11 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (rejecting protective jurisdiction as the basis for taking jurisdiction over personal injury 
claims existing in cases removed under the 1988 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)–(3) (the Westfall Act), even if the defendant employee was eventually held not to 
have been acting within the scope of her employment); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) 
(―In Verlinden, we discussed the distinction between ‗jurisdictional statutes‘ and ‗the federal law under 
which [an] action arises, for Art. III purposes,‘ and recognized that pure jurisdictional statutes which 
seek ‗to do nothing more than grant jurisdiction over a particular class of cases‘ cannot support Art. III 
‗arising under‘ jurisdiction.‖ (citing Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 
(1983))); id. at 137 (―We have, in the past, not found the need to adopt a theory of ‗protective 
jurisdiction‘ to support Art. III ‗arising under‘ jurisdiction, Verlinden, supra, at 491 n.17, and we do 
not see any need for doing so here.‖); Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496 
(1983) (unanimous opinion). But see Mesa, 489 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by 
Marshall, J.) (noting that removal to federal court of purely state-law criminal cases might be proper 
under different circumstances). 
 101. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 282 (5th ed. 2007) (asserting that 
protective jurisdiction is ―primarily‖ of interest to scholars). 
 102. 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3565 (3d ed. 
2008) (―[I]t is difficult to believe that the Court would accept the commentators‘ proposals for 
protective jurisdiction. To do so would wreak havoc on the long-accepted understanding of Article III 
as a limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts.‖). 
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jurisdiction paired with the notion that the federal courts would lack 
declaratory authority over the substantive law at issue. 
The leading case is Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter,
103
 where the Court 
refused to take statutory federal question jurisdiction over a federal statute 
in which Congress created a cause of action to adjudicate competing 
claims to mining rights.
104
 The act in Shoshone granted a federal cause of 
action to enforce state and territorial property rights, which is to say that 
Congress enacted a mandatory cross-reference to state-law property rights 
coupled with a federal cause of action.
105
 Indeed, the Court specifically 
held that the rule of decision in these cases would be provided by a 
mandatory cross-reference to state law, noting that ―[t]he recognition by 
Congress of local customs and statutory provisions as at times controlling 
the right of possession does not incorporate them into the body of Federal 
law.‖106 The Court further held that statutory federal question jurisdiction 
did not arise here because ―the right of possession may not involve any 
question under the . . . laws of the United States, but simply a 
determination of local rules . . . or state statutes, or . . . a mere matter of 
fact.‖107 That is to say, the Court declined statutory federal question 
jurisdiction because it lacked the power to construct state law and refused 
to be deployed as a ―mere‖ determiner of state law and a fact finder.108  
 
 
 103. 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
 104. Id. at 513. 
 105. Id. at 508. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Shoshone is not an isolated case. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g 
& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 (2005) (recognizing Shoshone as an exception, though a limited one, to 
the Holmes test); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 
29 (1982) (holding that the federal courts lack § 1331 jurisdiction over claims under the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act because Congress instructs that these rights are to be determined by state law); 
Gully v. First Nat‘l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (―Today, even more clearly than in the past, the 
federal nature of the right to be established is decisive—not the source of the authority to establish it.‖ 
(internal quotations omitted)); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933) (―Federal 
jurisdiction may be invoked to vindicate a right or privilege claimed under a federal statute. It may not 
be invoked where the right asserted is non-federal, merely because the plaintiff‘s right to sue is derived 
from federal law . . . .‖); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1912) (holding that equitable 
quiet title actions, although a congressionally approved cause of action, lack statutory federal question 
jurisdiction when the right to the land in question is controlled by state law); Bay Shore Union Free 
Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 735 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal courts lacked § 1331 
jurisdiction because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act empowered plaintiff to sue but the 
rights at issue were entirely a matter of state law); City Nat‘l Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942, 945–46 
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the National Bank Act ―is not a sufficient basis for federal question 
jurisdiction simply because it incorporates state law‖ when the act makes usury, as defined by local 
state law, illegal, and the nondiverse parties were only contesting the meaning of North Carolina‘s 
usury law); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding no federal 
question arises where ―the real substance of the controversy . . . turns entirely upon disputed questions 
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Although the holdings in the Shoshone line of cases are limited to 
statutory federal question jurisdiction,
109
 the Shoshone Court offers dicta 
relating to Article III federal question jurisdiction.
110
 In rebutting a 
counterargument from counsel that Osborn, an Article III decision, 
grounds jurisdiction in the case, the Court contrasted the necessary federal 
ingredient sufficient to ground Article III jurisdiction in Osborn, the 
Bank‘s status as a federally chartered entity,111 with a federal statute 
creating a federal cause of action and deploying a mandatory cross-
reference to state-law rights.  
A statute authorizing an action to establish a right is very different 
from one which creates a right to be established. An action brought 
under the one may involve no controversy as to the scope and effect 
of the statute, while in the other case it necessarily involves such a 
controversy, for the thing to be decided is the extent of the right 
given by the statute.
112
 
The Court is opining—albeit in dicta—that a federal, statutory, mandatory 
cross-reference to a state-law right, even if coupled with a federal cause of 
action, will not vest Article III federal question jurisdiction because there 
is no substantive federal right for it to declare.
113
 
Shoshone‘s dicta is in line with the Court‘s holdings that Article III 
federal question jurisdiction vests over state-law causes of action coupled 
with state-law rights when brought by federally chartered entities. The 
Court held in Osborn, and more recently affirmed in American National 
Red Cross v. S.G.,
114
 that a suit involving a federally chartered corporation 
that takes its capacity to sue or be sued from federal law raises an Article 
III federal question.
115
 While such claims do not arise under § 1331,
116
 
 
 
of law and fact relating to compliance with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or effect of the 
federal statute itself‖). In previous work, I have noted other areas where the federal courts refuse 
statutory federal question jurisdiction over claims that lack a substantive federal right, even when 
coupled with a federal cause of action. See Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1667, 1690–91, 1706–07 (2008) (noting that federal courts refuse to 
take jurisdiction when a federal cause of action is coupled with a federal right that is merely 
procedural); id. at 1689–90 (noting that federal courts similarly refuse to take jurisdiction when a 
federal cause of action is coupled with a federal right that is frivolous). 
 109. See Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506. 
 110. Id. at 509–10. 
 111. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823–28 (1824). 
 112. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 510. 
 113. See infra notes 340–51 and accompanying text (arguing that this dicta presents a sound 
argument on functionalist grounds). 
 114. 505 U.S. 247 (1992). 
 115. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 817–18, 823 (holding the following language from the bank‘s charter 
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under the traditional interpretation, an Article III federal question arises in 
such suits because potentially the entity‘s ―capacity to sue or be sued, its 
capacity to enter into contracts, or a similar issue . . . would require 
interpretation and application of the . . . federal chartering statute.‖117 This 
potential for the exercise of federal court declaratory power over federal 
substantive rights, then, distinguishes the Shoshone line of cases, because 
there are no potential substantive issues of federal rights at issue in those 
suits.
118
 
The distinctions between Osborn, American National Red Cross, and 
Shoshone are even more transparent from an original-meaning perspective. 
The original meaning of Article III‘s grants of jurisdiction is best 
conceived against the backdrop of the then-existing procedure of writ 
pleading.
119
 From this vantage, it is clear that Osborn‘s use of the term 
federal ―ingredient‖ was a term of art, referencing nineteenth-century 
pleading practice.
120
 With this understanding at hand, it is evident that 
―ingredient‖ did not reference the mere possibility that a federal issue 
might arise, as the traditional view ascribes,
121
 but rather the necessity of 
such an occurrence.
122
 Indeed, under common law writ pleading, the 
Bank—in every case—would have to plead its capacity to sue or be sued, 
a question of federal law, in order to avoid dismissal.
123
 Under this view, 
then, Article III requires the presence of a substantive issue of federal 
 
 
sufficient to raise a federal ingredient under Article III: ―made able and capable in law, to sue and be 
sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in all State Courts 
having competent jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court of the United States‖ (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The Court has consistently so held. See Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 264–65; Verlinden 
B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983); Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 
485 (1933); Bankers Trust Co. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 241 U.S. 295, 305–06 (1916); Pac. R.R. 
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1885); see also Paul E. Lund, Federally Chartered Corporations 
and Federal Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 317, 330–37 (2009) (providing an overview of 
federal question jurisdiction for federally chartered corporations). 
 116. See Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 505 U.S. at 258. 
 117. Lund, supra note 115, at 331. 
 118. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting lack of substantive federal issue). 
 119. See Bellia, supra note 21, at 800–12 (arguing that Article III is best interpreted in light of 
writ-pleading concepts and that this insight produces important ramifications for understanding Article 
III federal question jurisdiction under Osborn, standing doctrine, and inferred-cause-of-action 
doctrine). 
 120. See id. at 801. 
 121. See Lund, supra note 115, at 331. 
 122. See Bellia, supra note 21, at 802 (―By ‗ingredient,‘ Marshall did not mean something that 
might arise in connection with the litigation of a cause of action, but rather an essential component of a 
cause of action.‖). 
 123. Id. at 804–05 (At common law, ―if the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts in the bill 
demonstrating a right to institute the proceeding, the defendant could demur. . . . And it was the federal 
law defining the Bank‘s capacities that established those facts.‖). 
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right, over which the federal courts have declaratory power,
124
 in order to 
vest Article III federal question jurisdiction. Such a necessary treatment of 
a federal issue is a far cry from the Shoshone line of cases, where the 
courts face no substantive issues of federal rights.
125
 
3. Waiving Sovereign Immunity to State-Law Suits 
In yet another variation on this cross-referencing theme, Congress may 
by statute waive sovereign immunity and vest the federal courts with 
federal question jurisdiction over mandatory cross-references to state-law 
causes of action coupled with state-law rights brought against the United 
States or other governmental entities. These classes of cases raise 
significant issues given that, from the analytical perspective deployed in 
this Article, they appear to be nearly identical to protective jurisdiction 
cases. The Court, however, has taken federal question jurisdiction in these 
cases because it views them as raising federal substantive defenses, thus 
triggering at least some substantive legal issues subject to the federal 
courts‘ declaratory power. 
Two statutes illustrate this point well. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA),
126
 for example, waives the federal government‘s sovereign 
immunity for certain vicarious liability tort claims resulting from federal 
employees‘ actions.127 Similarly, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act 
(FSIA) extends immunity defenses to foreign governments subject to 
seven exceptions.
128
 Both acts mandatorily cross-reference state-law 
causes of actions and rights. Thus, when immunity is not extended, the 
FTCA and FSIA aim to render the government defendants subject to 
liability as if they were private entities.
129
 Furthering the goal of treating 
governments like a private entity, both acts require the application of state 
law to the claims brought.
130
 The starting point in this regard under the 
 
 
 124. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824) (―[T]he title or right set 
up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, 
and sustained by the opposite construction.‖). 
 125. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting lack of substantive federal issue). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2401–02, 2411–12, 2671–80 (2006). 
 127. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (holding that the FTCA removes 
sovereign immunity). 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2006). 
 129. Id. (―[A]s to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to 
immunity . . . , the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual in like circumstances . . . .‖); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (nearly identical language 
for FTCA cases). 
 130. The Court has spoken to this issue under the FSIA. See First Nat‘l City Bank v. Banco Para 
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (holding that, absent federal interest 
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FTCA is the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA‘s jurisdictional statute, 
which states that the United States shall be vicariously liable in tort for 
certain acts of its employees ―if a private person[] would be liable to the 
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred.‖131 In applying this provision, and similar provisions under the 
FSIA,
132
 the Court holds that the FTCA ―requires application of the whole 
law of the State where the act or omission occurred.‖133 
These cross-references to state law in FTCA and FSIA cases, 
moreover, are of a mandatory nature. Although the federal courts possess 
background constitutional power to fashion rules of liability for the claims 
against the United States,
134
 the FTCA creates a statutory bar to the use of 
that power. As such, the Court holds ―that federal courts should not create 
interstitial federal common law [in FTCA suits because] . . . the Congress 
has directed that a whole body of state law shall apply.‖135 Under the 
 
 
preemption, federal common law does not apply in FSIA cases); Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (―We now turn to the core question presented by this case: whether 
Congress exceeded the scope of Art. III of the Constitution by granting federal courts subject-matter 
jurisdiction over certain civil actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns where the rule of 
decision may be provided by state law.‖); Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 173 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (―State law, not federal common law, governs whether an officer‘s or employee‘s action is 
within the scope of employment in determining the applicability of the FSIA.‖). The Supreme Court 
has been remarkably consistent in holding that § 1346(b)‘s reference to the ―law of the place‖ means 
the law of the State. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 29 n.4 (1977); United States v. 
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards, 369 U.S. at 6–7, 11; Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 
U.S. 315, 318 (1957). The courts of appeals are similarly consistent. See, e.g., DeJesus v. U.S. Dept. of 
Veterans Affairs, 479 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (―Because the liability of the United States under 
the FTCA is determined by the law of the state where the allegedly tortious act occurred, . . . we will 
look to the state courts to determine how to resolve the underlying legal issues.‖); Young v. United 
States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1242 (6th Cir. 1995) (―[L]iability on the part of the federal government under the 
[FTCA] is determined in accordance with the law of the state where the event giving rise to liability 
occurred.‖). 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
 132. See, e.g., Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2005) (listing 
cases). 
 133. Richards, 369 U.S. at 11 (holding that state law controls choice-of-law issues, as well as 
substantive tort law, in FTCA cases). I am putting aside complicated questions of which law applies 
under the FTCA if a tort occurs in Indian Country or in a federal enclave. See, e.g., J. Matthew Martin, 
Federal Malpractice in Indian Country and the “Law of the Place”: A Re-Examination of Williams v. 
United States Under Existing Law of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
483 (2007) (arguing that tribal law should apply in FTCA cases when torts occur in Indian Country). 
 134. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that federal 
courts are empowered to create federal common law governing the rights and obligations of the United 
States). 
 135. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105 n.8 (1971); Canipe v. Nat‘l Loss Control Serv. 
Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1059–60 (5th Cir. 1984) (―[I]t is reasonably well recognized that the federal 
government is liable under the FTCA only if the applicable state law would place liability upon a 
private actor in like circumstances.‖); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(―Moreover, by adopting the ‗law of the place‘ as the source for rules of decision under the Federal 
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FTCA, then, the federal courts are strictly bound to apply state law
136
 as 
the controlling substantive law
137
 as a matter of statutory command, not 
judicial interstitial choice.
138
 Further illustrating that the FTCA imposes a 
mandatory cross-reference to state law, many federal courts hold that the 
application of state law in FTCA cases affords even less leeway for the 
occasional adoption of a federal rule of decision than is found under the 
Erie doctrine.
139
 The federal courts find a similar lack of federal common 
lawmaking authority under the FSIA.
140
 As such, the FSIA‘s and FTCA‘s 
 
 
Tort Claims Act, Congress expressly negated any possible inference that federal courts were to 
exercise any ‗common law-making‘ power to fashion torts under the Act in the interest of national 
uniformity.‖). One district court decision holds to the contrary, but the vast weight of authority 
suggests this holding is in error. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1210 
(E.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that the view that ―the FTCA requires the application of state law operative 
of its own force . . . is erroneous; instead, the Act provides for the application of state law incorporated 
into federal law as the federal rule of decision‖). 
 136. See, e.g., Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (―[W]e are bound to 
decide the issue the way the Florida courts would have . . . .‖); Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 
776 (7th Cir. 2008) (―It is also true . . . that in a suit under the [FTCA] . . . the damages rules of the 
state whose law governs the substantive issues in the case bind the federal court; damages law is 
substantive law.‖); Goodman v. United States, 2 F.3d 291, 292 (8th Cir. 1993) (―In this FTCA case, 
we are, of course, bound to apply the law of the state in which the acts complained of occurred.‖). 
 137. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (holding that claims of federal constitutional 
violations are not cognizable under the FTCA because under the FTCA, state law provides the sole 
font of substantive law). 
 138. The Court has only once contemplated the application of federal common law as the rule of 
decision in an FTCA case. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1993). Smith is unique, 
however, in that the alleged torts occurred in Antarctica, where state law does not govern and, 
arguably, no sovereign‘s law applies. Id. The Court, however, avoided this difficulty by holding that 
Antarctica was a foreign country within the meaning of the FTCA‘s foreign-country exception to tort 
liability. Id. at 203–04. 
 139. See Cibula v. United States, 551 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 2009) (―Thus, because the FTCA 
contains an explicit instruction by Congress regarding which law to use, courts should not engage in 
their normal Erie analysis to make that determination.‖ (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 
201 (1993))); Bravo, 532 F.3d at 1164 (in a FTCA case, holding itself bound by rulings from the 
Florida Third District Court of Appeal contrary to practice under Erie in which state intermediate 
appellate rulings are persuasive but not binding under Comm‘r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 
(1967)); Ware v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 1442, 1473 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (―[FTCA suits] do not 
implicate the same concerns of Erie. Because a FTCA plaintiff may not bring suit in any other forum 
but federal district court, there is no danger of forum shopping. Nor are federalism concerns 
implicated. States are not granted residual power under the Constitution to implement laws governing 
suits against the federal government.‖). Additionally, federal courts in FTCA cases squarely prohibit 
federal common law making, see supra note 135, whereas federal courts retain some common law 
making power under Erie. See, e.g., Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 
(2001) (fashioning a federal common law rule of res judicata under the Erie doctrine). There are a 
handful of district court cases, however, that equate Erie doctrine‘s use of state law with FTCA insofar 
as both employ the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2005). See Mills v. U.S. Dept. of Health 
& Human Servs., Civ. No. 08-3409, 2008 WL 5189140, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2008); Rahimi v. 
United States, 474 F. Supp. 2d 825, 827 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728, 
734 (D.N.J. 1995). 
 140. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983) (―We now turn 
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cross-references to state law are best viewed as being imposed 
mandatorily.
141
  
Despite the mandatory nature of the cross-reference to state-law causes 
of action and rights under the FTCA, confusion continues to reign in 
regard to the basis, both statutory and constitutional, for jurisdiction under 
the FTCA.
142
 Many lower federal courts, for example, hold that FTCA 
cases take jurisdiction under both § 1346(b), the FTCA‘s jurisdictional 
statute, and § 1331, the general federal question jurisdictional statute.
143
  
The more sound view, however, is that jurisdiction to hear FTCA 
claims does ―not come from the general grant of federal-question 
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.‖144 Standard application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule bars § 1331 jurisdiction over FTCA suits. The 
FTCA is merely a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to state-law 
claims.
145
 Although the waiver of immunity is of a jurisdictional 
dimension, it is best viewed, procedurally speaking, as a defense.
146
 As a 
 
 
to the core question presented by this case: whether Congress exceeded the scope of Art. III of the 
Constitution by granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over certain civil actions by foreign 
plaintiffs against foreign sovereigns where the rule of decision may be provided by state law.‖); see 
also First Nat‘l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) 
(holding that, absent federal interest preemption, federal common law does not apply in FSIA cases); 
Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2005) (listing cases). 
 141. See Horn v. HT Assocs., Civ. No. 09-3362, 2010 WL 1530624, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2010) 
(―There is no evidence, manifest or otherwise, that Congress intended to supplant state tort law by 
enacting the FTCA. . . . Far from altering or superseding state tort law, the statute incorporates the 
substantive law of the state where the injury occurred for the purposes of determining liability.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
 142. See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 3563 n.26 (―There is debate about 
whether suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . are federal question cases or whether . . . they 
come under the constitutional grant of judicial power to ‗Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party.‘‖). 
 143. See, e.g., Luna v. United States, 454 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2006) (―The Navy characterizes 
this as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is not. The district court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction because Luna brought her claim under the FTCA, which is to say she presented the district 
court with a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.‖); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 
F.3d 1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2005) (similar); Meyers v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 983 F.2d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 
1993); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975); U.S. Marine, Inc. 
v. United States, Civ. No. 08-2571, 2010 WL 1403958, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2010) (―The Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. 
(Federal Tort Claims Act).‖); Hankes v. United States, No. 08-CV-333-JHP-TLW, 2010 WL 2196561, 
at *1 (N.D. Okla. May 27, 2010) (similar). 
 144. CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Gilberg v. Stepan Co., 24 
F. Supp. 2d 325, 346 (D.N.J. 1998) (―When Congress granted the federal courts original (and 
exclusive) jurisdiction over Federal Tort Claims Act (―FTCA‖) actions, it did so under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b)(1), not section 1331.‖). 
 145. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976) (―The Federal Tort Claims Act is a 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a 
private party for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.‖). 
 146. The Court regularly treats federal sovereign immunity as a defense. See, e.g., United States v. 
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result, the existence, or lack thereof, of a federal sovereign immunity 
defense, even if addressed by the plaintiff in the complaint, will not vest 
§ 1331 jurisdiction.
147
 As such, a claim that the FTCA bars, or allows, a 
suit should not survive a well-pleaded complaint rule challenge to § 1331 
jurisdiction.
148
  
Even if one finds that the jurisdictional nature of the FTCA renders the 
well-pleaded complaint rule inapplicable,
149
 FTCA cases should not arise 
under § 1331 doctrine. The traditional determinant for taking § 1331 
jurisdiction is the Holmes test (i.e., § 1331 vests because federal law 
creates the plaintiff‘s cause of action).150 FTCA claims raise state-law 
causes of action, not federal ones, against the United States,
151
 which will 
 
 
Interstate Commerce Comm‘n, 337 U.S. 426, 462 (1949) (―The defense of sovereign immunity, 
moreover, cannot be avoided by directing that the suit proceed only against the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.‖ (emphasis added)); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (discussing 
sovereign immunity defense and jurisdiction). The courts of appeals have aptly labeled these 
jurisdictional defenses. See, e.g., Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.6 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (―It is well-established law that . . . jurisdictional defenses cannot be waived by the parties 
and may be raised for the first time on appeal or even raised by a court sua sponte.‖); see also Roberts 
v. United States, 887 F.2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1989) (similar). 
 147. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 
(1983) (holding that the presence of federal immunity defense, even if pleaded on face of complaint, is 
not sufficient to bring a claim within § 1331 jurisdiction). 
 148. See, e.g., Gilberg v. Stepan Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 325, 346–47 (D.N.J. 1998) (―Nor would such 
a claim fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1331‘s grant of jurisdiction . . . because the federal agency or employee 
could raise an immunity defense under the FTCA‘s exclusive remedy provision. Under the ‗well-
pleaded complaint‘ rule, a claimant‘s cause of action does not ‗arise under‘ the laws of the United 
States merely because it might implicate a federal immunity defense.‖); see also Sanchez v. Beacon 
Info. Tech. & Staffing & Serv., LLC, No. EP-08-CV-332-KC, 2009 WL 4877705, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 10, 2009) (similar). 
 149. For example, there is some confusion regarding whether the exceptions to the FTCA‘s 
waiver of immunity, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680, constitute jurisdictional issues or affirmative 
defenses for the government. Two circuits view this as a defense. See Prescott v. United States, 973 
F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992) (―Because an exception to the FTCA‘s general waiver of immunity, 
although jurisdictional on its face, is analogous to an affirmative defense, we believe . . . the burden 
[lies] on the United States as the party which benefits from the defense.‖); Stewart v. United States, 
199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (holding that the exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity in 
the FTCA are affirmative defenses that must be raised and proven by the government). Three circuits 
have adopted a contrary holding. See Sharp v. United States, 401 F.3d 440, 443 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that Prescott may conflict with United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), and declining to 
address whether the plaintiff or the Government has the burden of proving the FTCA‘s discretionary 
function exception); Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1105 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); Autery 
v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1526 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) (same). 
 150. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (―A suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action.‖).  
 151. See, e.g., CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 143 n7 (3d Cir. 2008) (―[Section] 1346(b)(1) 
grants federal courts jurisdiction and also allows plaintiffs to bring state-law causes of action . . . .‖); 
Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 185 (1st Cir. 1998) (―[T]he basis for Irving‘s state-law cause of 
action and FTCA claim, was the failure of the compliance officers to inspect . . . .‖); Dorking Genetics 
v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1266 (2d Cir. 1996) (―The FTCA does not create new causes of action, 
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not arise under the Holmes test. Section 1331 jurisdiction over federal 
common law causes of action that adopt a state-law right is inapposite 
here.
152
 Nor do FTCA cases raise federal rights for plaintiffs; thus, even 
under a Smith test approach to § 1331 jurisdiction, FTCA cases would not 
raise a federal question.
153
  
A proponent of § 1331 jurisdiction over FTCA cases might retort that, 
despite the wealth of authority to the contrary, FTCA cases create federal 
causes of action, thus triggering jurisdiction under the Holmes test. Such 
an advocate could rely upon the Court‘s occasional references to the 
FTCA as creating a federal cause of action.
154
 Under this construction, 
then, the FTCA would create a federal cause of action that is coupled with 
state-law tort rights supplying the substantive rights at issue.
155
 Therefore, 
one might conclude that § 1331 jurisdiction lies under the Holmes test, as 
the cause of action is federal. Such a proposition, however, is barred by 
the Shoshone line of cases,
156
 given that under the FTCA, just as in 
Shoshone, the entire set of substantive rights to be determined by the 
federal courts would be controlled by state law, leaving them without 
declaratory authority over the plaintiff‘s substantive claim.157 As such, 
there appears no sound basis for § 1331 jurisdiction over FTCA or FSIA 
cases. 
The existence of constitutional federal question jurisdiction more easily 
lies under both the FSIA and the FTCA. There are two potential fonts of 
federal jurisdiction for FTCA cases: ―Controversies to which the United 
 
 
but only waives immunity under [enumerated] circumstances . . . .‖); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 
725 (5th Cir. 1995) (―[T]he district court recognized that ‗an FTCA claim must be based on a state law 
cause of action.‘‖). 
 152. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) (―[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will 
support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.‖). 
 153. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–13 (2005) 
(reaffirming that the courts may take Smith-style jurisdiction); Mulligan, supra note 108, at 1725 
(―[T]he primary determinate for the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction is the status of the federal right 
asserted.‖); infra note 179 (discussing Smith-style jurisdiction). 
 154. See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 562 (1988) (explaining that § 2679(a) limits the scope of 
waivers ―in the context of suits for which [Congress] provided a cause of action under the FTCA‖ 
(emphasis added)); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (quoting this language from 
Loeffler and speaking in terms of statutory elements of an FTCA claim); Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. 
v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing statutory elements of FTCA claims); 
Dorking Genetics, 76 F.3d at 1264 (discussing statutory elements of FTCA claims); Fred Blanton, 
Jurisdictional Problems of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 13 U. PITT. L. REV. 511, 513–15 (1952) 
(arguing that federal law creates the plaintiffs‘ cause of action in FTCA cases). 
 155. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text (discussing the application of state law as the 
substantive rule of decision in FTCA cases). 
 156. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Shoshone cases). 
 157. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text (discussing the application of state law as the 
substantive rule of decision in FTCA cases). 
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States shall be a Party‖ and ―Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the 
United States.‖158 Given that state law controls in FTCA cases and that the 
federal government is always a party defendant in FTCA cases, one might 
conclude that the former constitutional grant of jurisdiction is the 
unquestionable starting point. But the Court has not always agreed with 
this reading. 
In 1933, the Court, in Williams v. United States, held that suits against 
the government did not fall within the meaning of controversies to which 
the United States shall be a party.
159
 The Court based this interpretation of 
the ―party clause‖ upon the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789,160 which 
granted jurisdiction only for suits in which the United States was plaintiff, 
and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which constitutionalizes state 
sovereign immunity broadly.
161
 From this vantage point, the Court held 
that ―controversies to which the United States may by statute be made a 
party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of 
the judicial power vested by Art. III in the constitutional courts.‖162 This 
holding was destined for the jurisprudential scrap heap, however. In fact, 
most commentators find this portion of Williams overturned by the 
plurality opinion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.
163
 
 
 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 159. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933). 
 160. Id.; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (―And shall also have cognizance, 
concurrent as last mentioned, of all suits at common law where the United States sue, and the matter in 
dispute amounts, exclusive of costs, to the sum or value of one hundred dollars.‖). 
 161. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 3524 (providing general overview of Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
 162. Williams, 289 U.S. at 577 (discussing the first judiciary act and two landmark Eleventh 
Amendment cases: Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 
(1793)). This had not been the Court‘s view prior. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 384 
(1902) (A suit against a federal officer and agency ―is a controversy to which the United States may be 
regarded as a party. . . . It is, of course, under that clause, a matter of indifference whether the United 
States is a party plaintiff or defendant. It could not fairly be adjudged that the judicial power of the 
United States extends to those cases in which the United States is a party plaintiff and does not extend 
to those cases in which it is a party defendant.‖). There is also an argument that this portion of 
Williams is dicta. See Nat‘l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 640 n.20 (1949) 
(Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (advancing this argument). 
 163. 370 U.S. 530, 564 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (―Article III‘s extension of judicial 
competence over controversies to which the United States is a party [is] ineffective to confer 
jurisdiction over suits to which it is a defendant [only when Congress has not waived immunity]. . . . 
But once the consent is given, the postulate is satisfied, and there remains no [Article III] barrier to 
justiciability.‖). But Justice Harlan was speaking only for three of the seven Justices who heard the 
case. See id. at 585 (Clark, J., concurring) (―I cannot agree to the unnecessary overruling of . . . 
Williams . . . .‖). Despite the lack of a majority opinion overruling Williams, all the lower courts and 
commentators agree that Glidden overruled Williams. See, e.g., Jan‘s Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 
525 F.3d 1299, 1306 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Kanar v. U.S. 118 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 1997) (―No one 
today doubts that Article III courts may entertain suits against the United States seeking money 
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Despite the fact that Glidden overturned Williams, for the thirty years 
that it remained good law, Williams pushed jurists to find another basis for 
constitutional jurisdiction over cases, like FTCA suits, in which the United 
States was a party defendant—a path that led many to conclude that 
jurisdiction for such cases arises as federal questions. This issue bubbled 
to the surface in 1949 with some members of the Court in Tidewater 
taking a hard line and espousing that there was no basis, federal question 
or otherwise, under Article III to find constitutional jurisdiction in such 
cases.
164
 Nevertheless, a majority of the Justices in Tidewater opined that 
suits against the United States, like FTCA suits, arise under constitutional 
federal question jurisdiction.
165
  
The basis for this position, at least as offered by Chief Justice Vinson, 
is that statutory waiving of sovereign immunity, a prerequisite to any suit 
against the United States, necessarily calls for the application of federal 
law.
166
 Under Chief Justice Vinson‘s view, the waiver issue is viewed as a 
defense
167
 to a state-law cause of action that will necessarily arise in every 
action.
168
 Further, the immunity defense is subject to the declaratory 
authority of the federal courts. The Court in Verlinden B. V. v. Central 
 
 
damages . . . . Williams . . . [was] repudiated in Glidden . . . .‖); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 69 
& n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) (similar); see also 14 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 3654 & n.72 (―[I]n the 
1962 case of Glidden Company v. Zdanok, the Court rejected the Williams analysis . . . .‖); Robert N. 
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures 
from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1546 n.117 (1986) (similar); Alfred Hill, In 
Defense of our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 540 n.264 (2001) (similar). 
 164. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 594 n.22 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (―The suggestion here that 
claims against the United States, adjudicated . . . solely by virtue of the waiver of sovereign immunity 
and the jurisdiction granted . . . [by statute], may be cases arising ‗under the laws of the United States‘ 
is both erroneous and self-defeating. . . . Williams . . . holds clearly to the contrary, stating . . . that 
controversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant lie wholly outside 
the scope of the judicial power vested by Art. III . . . .‖ (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 165. Id. at 610 (Rutledge, J. concurring, joined by Murphy, J.) (―We need not today determine the 
nature of district court jurisdiction of suits against the United States. Suffice it to say that, if such suits 
are not ‗Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,‘ they are presumptively within the 
purview of the federal-question jurisdiction . . . .‖); id. at 641 n.21 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting, joined by 
Douglas, J.) (―Whether or not the dictum in Williams . . . that suits against the United States are not 
within the Art. III phrase, ‗Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,‘ proves correct, 
. . . such actions seem to be clearly within the Art. III federal question jurisdiction.‖); id. at 649 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Reed, J.) (reasoning that the following constitutionally arise 
under federal law: ―Congress can authorize the making of contracts; it can therefore authorize suit 
thereon in any district court. Congress can establish post offices; it can therefore authorize suits against 
the United States for the negligent killing of a child by a post-office truck.‖). 
 166. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 641 n.21 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 167. See supra note 146 (discussing sovereign immunity as a defense). 
 168. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 642 n.21 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
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Bank of Nigeria
169
 similarly found, in the context of waivers of sovereign 
immunity for foreign states under the FSIA, that the necessity of 
addressing the waiver question in each case established Article III federal 
question jurisdiction over state-law causes of action.
170
 Although this 
solution is not universally satisfying,
171
 this addition of a federally 
controlled defense is sufficient, at least on its face, to distinguish the 
immunity waiver cases from protective jurisdiction, even though both sets 
of cases deploy mandatory cross-references to state-law causes of action 
and rights. This view, that suits against the United States arise under 
constitutional federal question jurisdiction, has also been espoused by 
eminent commentators such as Professors Mishkin
172
 and Wright.
173
 
Moreover, this view continues to hold sway, many years after Glidden 
overturned the Williams decision.
174
 We see, therefore, that 
congressionally imposed, mandatory cross-references to state-law rights 
may give rise to federal question jurisdiction, but only when the courts 
retain declaratory authority over some other aspect of the suit such as a 
defense.
175
 
4. State-Law Mandatory Cross-References to Federal Law 
I turn now to state-law mandatory cross-references to federal rights. 
Here I contend the courts take federal question jurisdiction when the cross-
 
 
 169. 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (―The [FSIA] must be applied by the district courts in every action 
against a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the 
existence of one of the specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity . . . .‖). 
 170. Id.; 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 3563 n.26 (considering the Court‘s treatment of 
Article III federal question jurisdiction under the FSIA in Verlinden as similar to its treatment of 
Article III jurisdiction under the FTCA). 
 171. See Seinfeld, supra note 67, at 1423, 1434 (describing protective jurisdiction as a cousin of 
the Court‘s treatment of sovereign immunity and Article III arising under jurisdiction in Verlinden). 
 172. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 193 (noting as part of his discussion of protective jurisdiction that 
―if one accepts the doctrine that suits against the Government are not ‗controversies to which the 
United States [is] a party‘ within Article III, this narrower rationale of Osborn would then explain 
federal question jurisdiction over cases under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which makes a specific 
reference to state law for the operative rules‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 173. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 34 (3d ed. 1976) (―It is also not clear why a 
suit against the United States, authorized by federal statute, is not a case arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.‖). 
 174. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 442 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (―[T]he ―substitution of the United States as defendant . . . establishes federal-question 
jurisdiction . . . .‖); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 560 n.7 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(‖Federal jurisdiction is supported not only by the fact that [this FTCA] case is one arising under a law 
of the United States, but also that it is a controversy to which the United States is a party.‖). 
 175. Cf. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989) (holding that federal question jurisdiction 
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 for federal officers defending against state-law claims only when the 
federal officer raises a federal-law defense). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/3
  
 
 
 
 
2011] JURISDICTION BY CROSS-REFERENCE 1209 
 
 
 
 
reference is mandatory. Although this produces a model in which state-law 
cross-references vest federal question jurisdiction in a mirror-image 
fashion to federal-law cross-references to state law, these modes of cross-
referencing both correlate federal question jurisdiction with federal court 
declaratory authority.  
State law frequently cross-references federal law in a mandatory 
fashion. Some statutes create state-law causes of action that mandatorily 
cross-reference federal rights.
176
 State common law causes of action often 
mandatorily cross-reference federal statutory
177
 and constitutional
178
 rights. 
These types of cross-references have caused the courts and scholars 
jurisdictional fits for decades.
179
  
 
 
 176. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1(d) (West 2007) (cross-referencing rights created by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2003) (creating cause of action against 
employers who discipline or discharge an employee for exercising First Amendment rights); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (2003) (similar cross-reference to federal constitutional rights); see also GA. 
CODE. ANN. § 16-14-3(9)(A) (Supp. 2010) (defining racketeering by cross-reference to federal 
statutes); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-101(a) (2008) (defining prohibited narcotics by cross-reference to 
federal statute). 
 177.  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311–12 
(2005) (applying IRS standard in a quiet title action); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 
U.S. 804, 805–07 (1986) (seeking to use federal FDA standard in a negligence per se action); Vinnick 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (Ct. App. 2001) (―[The] negligence per se standard 
can be applied to a violation of federal standards . . . .‖); Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 642 So. 2d 
774, 776, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a violation of the federal Gun Control Act can 
amount to negligence per se); Lohmann ex rel. Lohmann v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 948 S.W.2d 659, 
672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff could argue ―negligence per se in failing to comply 
with federal regulations‖). But see Lugo v. St. Nicholas Assocs., 772 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454–55 (Sup. Ct. 
2003) (―[T]he ADA does not create a private cause of action for damages for its violation. If mere 
proof of a violation of the ADA were to establish negligence per se, plaintiff would effectively be 
afforded a private cause of action that the ADA does not recognize. The court accordingly holds that 
proof of a violation of the ADA may only constitute evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.‖). 
 178.  See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 246, 248 (Ala. 2000) (holding state law torts of 
assault, unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy barred as a matter of law because the 
police officer met the Fourth Amendment‘s probable cause standard when detaining the plaintiff); 
Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278–79 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the 
plaintiff‘s state law claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false 
imprisonment failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff ―did not meet his burden of producing 
evidence showing [the defendants] used physical force against or exerted authority over him that 
resulted in a ‗seizure‘ under the Fourth Amendment‖); Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 
(Pa. 1994) (noting that a plaintiff alleging false imprisonment must show that a defendant‘s actions 
were unlawful, which often amounts to whether a defendant acting under color of law had probable 
cause). 
 179. See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (Holmes 
test is a rule of inclusion); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 
9 (1983) (same and quoting T.B. Harms); Fitzgerald, supra note 23, at 1241–45 (describing the Court‘s 
―two-track‖ approach to § 1331 jurisdiction); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling 
Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 324–28 (2007) (arguing that 
the Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), line of cases employs a different test 
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The Court, however, recently clarified the law here in Grable & Sons 
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.
180
 In Grable 
& Sons, the IRS seized real property belonging to Grable & Sons to satisfy 
a federal tax deficiency and sold the property to Darue Engineering.
181
 
Five years later, Grable & Sons sued Darue Engineering in state court to 
quiet title, a state-law cause of action.
182
 Grable & Sons asserted that 
Darue Engineering‘s title was invalid because the IRS had conveyed the 
seizure notice to Grable & Sons in violation of provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code governing such actions.
183
 The Supreme Court affirmed 
§ 1331 jurisdiction in the case because the plaintiff‘s state-law cause of 
action necessarily depended upon a claim of a substantive federal right.
184
 
The Court elaborated on this holding, ruling that § 1331 jurisdiction will 
exist if the plaintiff asserts a ―substantial‖ and ―serious‖ claim to a 
federally created right,
185
 the federal right is the central and predominant 
question in the case,
186
 the legal content of the federal right invoked is 
actually contested by the parties,
187
 and taking jurisdiction in the case 
comports with congressional intent regarding the division of labor between 
the state and federal courts.
188
 Worthy of note, this test under Grable & 
 
 
than the Holmes line of cases); Oakley, supra note 14, at 1837–43 (describing the distinction between 
Category-I and Category-II jurisdiction). 
 180. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 181. Id. at 310–11. 
 182. Id. at 311. 
 183. Id. (Grable maintained that the IRS failed to comply with the notice procedures of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6335(a) (2006)). 
 184. 545 U.S. at 316. 
 185. See, e.g., id. at 313 (―It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal 
jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious 
federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.‖).  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. To be clear, the Court treats the substantial right factor as necessary, but not sufficient, for 
finding § 1331 jurisdiction. Id. at 318–19. It also requires a finding that jurisdiction ―is consistent with 
congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing 
the application of § 1331.‖ Id. at 313–14. For lower court examples of this specific finding of 
congressional intent, see Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 19496 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(applying Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over a state-law contract claim that required 
construction of federal cable television law because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of 
litigation in state and federal courts); Municipality of San Juan v. Corporación Para El Fomento 
Económico De La Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Grable & Sons and 
taking jurisdiction over state-law contract claim that required construction of HUD regulations); see 
also Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal 
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1793 (1992) 
(arguing that federal question jurisdiction over hybrid claims should lie to ―increase the level of state-
federal judicial interchange in the shaping and development of the relevant federal statute‖); Note, Mr. 
Smith Goes to Federal Court, supra note 14, at 2292 (arguing that by incorporating federal law, ―a 
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Sons is, in essence, a means of maintaining statutory federal question 
jurisdiction only in those cases in which the federal courts will be called 
upon to exercise declaratory authority over the federal question—
jurisdiction does not lie when the case is fact bound or rides entirely upon 
the construction of state law.
189
 
Despite the dynamic nature of § 1331 doctrine in this area, the Court 
has consistently held that there is Article III jurisdiction to hear state 
statutory claims that mandatorily cross-reference federal law, as well as 
jurisdiction in the Court itself on certiorari under § 1257.
190
 This taking of 
jurisdiction coincides with the retention of declaratory power over the 
question of federal law embedded in the state-law cause of action.
191
 Thus, 
the Court recognizes that these mandatory invocations of federal law 
present opportunities to exercise declaratory power over the cross-
referenced law, justifying the vesting of at least Article III jurisdiction. 
B. Discretionary Cross-References 
In this section, I take up discretionary cross-references. Recall that a 
discretionary cross-reference is one that does not bind the forum court to 
application of the cross-referenced law, but rather deploys the cross-
reference as part of the forum court‘s rule-creating endeavor.192 Here I 
assert that the federal courts continue to vest federal question jurisdiction 
in a manner that correlates with their declaratory authority over the cross-
referenced law, but in a fashion that creates a mirror image to the taking of 
jurisdiction when a mandatory cross-reference is at issue. Thus, the federal 
courts take federal question jurisdiction over federal discretionary cross-
references to state-law rights because these are instances where the federal 
 
 
state might be understood to have waived its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over a violation of the 
hybrid law‖). 
 189. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006) 
(The court refused § 1331 jurisdiction under Grable because ―Grable presented a nearly ‗pure issue of 
law,‘ . . . . In contrast, Empire‘s reimbursement claim . . . is fact-bound and situation-specific.‖). 
 190. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214–17 (1934) (holding that a 
state, statutory, mandatory cross-reference to the federal Safety Appliance Act did not arise under 
§ 1331, but that there was Article III jurisdiction to hear such claims as well as jurisdiction under the 
Supreme Court‘s jurisdictional statute). 
 191. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 n.14 (1986), where the 
Court held that a cross-reference to federal law in a state common law action did not arise under 
§ 1331 but held that ―[p]etitioner‘s concern about the uniformity of interpretation, moreover, is 
considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district court jurisdiction for these 
kinds of action, this Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of 
action.‖ Id. (citing Moore). 
 192. See supra Part II.B (defining discretionary cross-references). 
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courts are empowered to exercise declaratory authority to eschew the 
state-law rule. Conversely, the federal courts will not take federal question 
jurisdiction over state-law discretionary references to federal-law rights 
because such opinions would not produce binding holdings as to the cross-
referenced law. 
1. Tucker Act 
I begin my examination of federal discretionary cross-references to 
state-law rights with the Tucker Act.
193
 Under the Tucker Act, the Court of 
Federal Claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction of any civil action or 
claim against the United States, exceeding $10,000, founded either upon 
federal law or upon any express or implied-in-fact contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in 
tort.
194
 Under the so-called Mini-Tucker Act,
195
 the federal district courts 
have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims, for 
similar claims of less than $10,000.
196
 (I will refer to the Tucker and Mini-
Tucker Acts collectively as the Tucker Acts.)  
The cross-references to state law of contract under the Tucker Acts are 
discretionary. The courts consider the Tucker Acts themselves as merely 
jurisdictional, even though they both waive sovereign immunity, relying 
upon other bodies of law to create substantive rights.
197
 Given that the 
Tucker Acts do not create substantive law, the cross-reference to state law 
plays a key role in these suits. Importantly, in terms of selecting rules of 
decision, the Tucker Acts, unlike the FTCA, do not provide that the United 
States is to be dealt with as if it were a ―private person.‖198 In line with 
their statutory directive,
199
 contract claims brought under the Tucker Acts 
are governed by federal common law,
200
 contrary to practice under the 
 
 
 193. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
 194. Id. The $10,000 threshold is actually laid out in the Mini-Tucker Act. See infra note 196 and 
accompanying text. 
 195. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2006). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400–02 (1976); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. 
United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 198. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (employing private person language), with § 1346(a) 
(lacking private person language). See also Malman v. United States, 207 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(making this distinction). 
 199. See Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting that lack of the 
―private person‖ language in the Tucker Acts supports the application of federal common law to 
contract claims under the Tucker Act). 
 200. See Nat‘l Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (en banc) 
(―Federal courts can and should proceed under the Tucker Act . . . to develop and establish just and 
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FTCA.
201
 Although these contract claims brought under the Tucker Acts 
are governed by federal common law, the federal courts often choose 
state-law contract rights as the rule of decision in such cases.
202
 Thus, in 
Tucker Act cases, the courts often face a federal cause of action coupled 
with a state-law right. 
At first blush, then, taking federal question jurisdiction in Tucker Act 
suits seems at odds with the Shoshone line of cases in which the Court 
does not take federal question jurisdiction.
203
 Both the Tucker Act cases 
and the Shoshone line of cases feature federal causes of action coupled 
with state-law rights. Nevertheless, cross-referencing under the Tucker 
Acts is best viewed as discretionary, rather than mandatory as is the case 
with the cross-reference in Shoshone,
204
 because the Court emphasizes the 
need to contemplate deviation from the state rule on a case-by-case basis 
 
 
practical principles of contract law for the Federal Government.‖); see also XTRA Lease, Inc. v. 
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 612, 621 (2001) (In Tucker Act suits, ―[d]ue to the absence of specific 
federal statutes that govern the interpretation of contracts, the courts have crafted a federal common 
law for government contracts.‖); Cegers v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 615, 621 n.10 (1985) (―[T]he 
validity and construction of contracts to which the federal government is a party is controlled by 
federal law.‖). The Court has made similar pronouncements regarding government contracts often, but 
not in the context of Tucker Act cases. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 
(1988); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592–94 (1973); United States v. 
Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1970); Nat‘l Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 
(1945); United States v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United 
States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943). 
 201. See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of role for federal 
common law in FTCA cases). 
 202. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing, Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000) 
(―When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed 
generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.‖ (quoting United States v. 
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (Souter, J., plurality opinion))); United States v. Winstar 
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (making the same statement in a Tucker 
Act suit in which the Court refused to apply sovereign-only rules to a government contract); United 
States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1876) (―The United States, when they contract with their citizens, 
are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf.‖); Ginsberg v. Austin, 968 F.2d 
1198, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Where federal law is not dispositive, courts should ―look to general 
property and contract law principles as they are embodied in state law pronouncements.‖); Cal. Or. 
Broad., Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 394, 399 (2006) (same in a Tucker Act suit). The Court takes 
this view of contract enforcement, that state law provides the rule of decision, in non–Tucker Act cases 
as well. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2006) (―In post-
Clearfield decisions, and with the benefit of enlightened commentary, the Court has made clear that 
uniform federal law need not be applied to all questions in federal government litigation, even in cases 
involving government contracts. The prudent course, we have recognized, is often to adopt the 
readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until Congress strikes a different 
accommodation.‖ (citations and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 
U.S. 715, 740 (1979) (similar); Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 369 (―The United States does business on 
business terms.‖ (quoting United States v. Nat‘l Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926))). 
 203.  See supra notes 104–13 and accompanying text (discussing the Shoshone line of cases). 
 204. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory nature of cross-
reference in the Shoshone line of cases). 
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in Tucker Act suits (i.e., the federal courts retain declaratory authority over 
the cross-referenced law in Tucker Act cases).
205
 As such, contract claims 
under the Tucker Acts present scenarios where federal common law 
provides the cause of action and the courts deploy a discretionary cross-
reference to state law to supply contractual rights, distinguishing these 
suits from the Shoshone line of rulings. Moreover, this recognition of 
declaratory authority over the cross-referenced law coincides with the 
courts taking federal question jurisdiction over the Tucker Acts. Thus, 
Justice Rutledge, concurring in Tidewater, stated that black-letter law 
supported the notion that Tucker Act suits arose under Article III federal 
question jurisdiction.
206
 And while there have been some differences of 
opinion regarding whether contractual claims against the United States 
may be brought in district court under § 1331
207
 or exclusively in the Court 
of Claims,
208
 there seems little doubt that the cases raise a species of 
statutory federal question jurisdiction.  
 
 
 205. See, e.g., Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 860 (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (stating that the issue 
in this Tucker Act suit was whether to apply special rules not available to private parties at state law, 
thus illustrating that the Court had the authority to deviate if it so chose); id. at 919 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting that he would keep the special sovereign defenses, further illustrating the authority 
of the Court to diverge from state law here); id. at 924, 937 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) (noting 
he would apply special contract rules in this instance, again illustrating the Court‘s authority to deviate 
from state law).  
 206. Nat‘l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 610 (1949) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring) (―Suffice it to say that, if such suits are not ‗Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party,‘ they are presumptively within the purview of the federal-question jurisdiction . . . . This is, 
at least, the conventional view of district court jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.‖). But see Jan‘s 
Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (―[T]he jurisdiction of the Court 
of Federal Claims . . . does not depend on the ‗arising under‘ clause of Article III . . . but rather on a 
separate clause in Article III that authorizes jurisdiction over all ‗controversies to which the United 
States is a party‘ . . . .‖). Given Tidewater, the better view is likely that Tucker Act cases arise under 
both constitutional provisions.  
 207. See C.H. Sanders Co. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 903 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1990) (―We 
hold that an action (regardless of the amount sought) may be commenced under § 1331 in the district 
court provided there is an independent waiver of sovereign immunity outside the Tucker Act.‖); see 
also W. Sec. Co. v. Derwinski, 937 F.2d 1276, 1280–81 (7th Cir. 1991) (similar); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. 
v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 182 n.14 (8th Cir. 1978) (similar). The D.C. Circuit has noted the split, but 
declined to comment. See Md. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 
1441, 1448 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 208. See Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006), modified on 
other grounds, 540 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2008); A.E. Finley & Assocs. v. United States, 898 F.2d 1165, 
1167 (6th Cir. 1990) (―[I]f an action rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court under 
the Tucker Act . . . the district court does not have jurisdiction regardless of other possible statutory 
bases.‖); New Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1321–22 (10th Cir. 1984); Graham v. Henegar, 640 
F.2d 732, 734 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1981) (similar). 
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2. Miller Act 
The courts provide a similar jurisdictional treatment for suits brought 
under the Miller Act. In large construction projects, the owner of the 
project typically enters into only one contract with a general contractor to 
complete the construction. This general contractor then contracts 
independently with subcontractors and suppliers in order to obtain 
appropriate tradespeople and get materials to the construction site. These 
subcontractors and suppliers, because they only contract with the general 
contractor, are not in contractual privity with the owner of the project. 
Therefore, they may only seek breach of contract remedies against the 
general contractor. In many circumstances, such as when the general 
contractor goes bankrupt, the inability to seek expectation damages on a 
breach of contract theory from the owner unduly frustrates these 
subcontractors and suppliers. Therefore, in the case of a private 
construction project, subcontractors and suppliers not made whole by a 
general contractor may place a lien, often called a mechanics lien, on the 
property itself and thus obtain expectation damages from the owner of the 
project. 
This mechanics lien scheme will not suffice for public construction 
projects, however. At the federal level, sovereign immunity bars the 
placing of a lien upon federal construction projects.
209
 Moreover, a claim 
under the Tucker Acts would be unavailing because the subcontractors and 
suppliers lack contractual privity with the federal government. As a result, 
the Miller Act, which requires general contractors to post a payment bond 
at the beginning of construction to satisfy unpaid claims to suppliers and 
subcontractors,
210
 was passed as a substitute remedy for materialmen and 
tradespeople to effectuate relief for breaches of contract by general 
contractors.
211
 Under the Act, subcontractors may sue the general 
contractor for breach and, because of the bond, be assured that the general 
contractor will not become judgment proof. The Miller Act directs that the 
federal district courts retain exclusive jurisdiction of these cases with the 
 
 
 209. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hill v. Am. Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 203 (1906) (―As against 
the United States, no lien can be provided upon its public buildings or grounds, and it was the purpose 
of this act to substitute the obligation of a bond for the security which might otherwise be obtained by 
attaching a lien to the property of an individual.‖). 
 210. 40 U.S.C. § 3131 (2006). 
 211. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b)(2) (requiring posting of payment bond); United States v. 
Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947) (―But nothing is more clear than that laborers and 
materialmen do not have enforceable rights against the United States for their compensation. They 
cannot acquire a lien on public buildings, and as a substitute for that more customary protection, the 
various statutes were passed which require that a surety guarantee their payment.‖ (citations omitted)). 
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United States serving as the nominal plaintiff for the benefit of the injured 
subcontractor.
212
  
While the Miller Act indubitably creates a statutory federal cause of 
action,
213
 the nature of the underlying contract right is the source of some 
confusion in Miller Act claims. Before 1974, the law appeared relatively 
settled that the Miller Act mandatorily cross-referenced state law to supply 
contract rights in such actions.
214
 Under this regime, the federal courts did 
not take jurisdiction over Miller Act suits as a federal question, but rather 
found jurisdiction because the United States was a party plaintiff.
215
 
The Supreme Court introduced confusion to this consensus view in F. 
D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.
216
 One issue in 
the case was whether the Miller Act provided for attorney‘s fees.217 The 
Court held that it did not.
218
 In so ruling, the Court stated that ―[t]he Miller 
Act provides a federal cause of action, and the scope of the remedy as well 
as the substance of the rights created thereby is a matter of federal not state 
law.‖219 As a result of this language, some lower courts now hold that 
federal common law governs contractual rights under the Miller Act as 
opposed to a mandatory cross-reference to state law, thus applying cross-
references to state law on a case-by-case fashion as a matter of 
 
 
 212. 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(3)(A) (2006); Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, Inc., 331 F.2d 467, 469 (6th 
Cir. 1964) (―Exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court was expressly conferred by the Miller Act.‖). 
 213. 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(1) (―Every person that has furnished labor or material in carrying out 
work provided for in a contract for which a payment bond is furnished . . . and that has not been paid 
in full . . . may bring a civil action on the payment bond for the amount unpaid at the time the civil 
action is brought and may prosecute the action to final execution and judgment for the amount due.‖). 
 214. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shields, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat‘l Bank, 367 F.2d 473, 477 
(4th Cir. 1966) (―We agree that the substantive law of North Carolina must be applied in determining 
the respective rights of the parties. Even though jurisdiction is conferred by the Miller Act, the 
construction of that statute is not at issue and all acts relevant to the subcontract in question and its 
performance occurred in North Carolina.‖); Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Mercury Elec. 
Co., 333 F.2d 89, 92 n.3 (9th Cir. 1964) (applying state contract law as the rule of decision in Miller 
Act case); United States ex rel. Ascher Corp. v. Bradley-Dodson Co., 281 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 
1960) (same); Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Luce, 269 F.2d 406, 411–12 (1st Cir. 1959) 
(same). 
 215. See, e.g., Cont‘l Cas. Co. v. Allsop Lumber Co., 336 F.2d 445, 449 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding 
that amount in controversy requirement of $10,000 then required under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 
1332 was inapplicable because ―the Miller Act provides another and different basis for federal court 
jurisdiction because it requires that the action be brought in the name of the United States‖); United 
States ex rel. Sligh v. Fullerton Const. Co., 296 F. Supp. 518, 522 (D.S.C. 1968) (similar), aff’d, 407 
F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Betts v. Cont‘l Cas. Co., 224 F. Supp. 857, 860 (W.D. 
Pa. 1964) (similar); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 1551 n.8 (citing pre-F.D. Rich cases for the 
proposition that Miller Act suits take federal jurisdiction because the United States is a party). 
 216. 417 U.S. 116 (1974). 
 217. Id. at 126. 
 218. Id. at 121. 
 219. Id. at 127. 
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discretion.
220
 Other lower courts limit F. D. Rich to Miller Act procedural 
issues, while continuing to view the cross-reference to contractual rights as 
governed by mandatory application of state law. Under this view, for 
―actions brought under the Miller Act, issues not involving construction of 
the [Miller] Act [itself], such as ordinary contract issues, will be resolved 
by the law of the state where contract is performed.‖221  
Tellingly for this study, this circuit split on whether the federal courts 
possess declaratory authority over the cross-referenced state-law rights 
under the Miller Act coincides with the courts‘ division on whether Miller 
Act cases arise under federal question jurisdiction. If the Miller Act is best 
viewed as a statutory directive to create a federal common law of 
contractual rights, and the cross-references to state contract rights are 
merely discretionary, then it follows that Miller Act cases arise as federal 
questions.
222
 If, however, the cross-reference to state contractual rights 
under the Miller Act is a mandatory one, in which the federal courts lack 
 
 
 220. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lighting & Power Servs., Inc. v. Interface Constr. Corp., 553 
F.3d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting F. D. Rich and holding that federal law governs the 
substantive contractual rights at issue in a Miller Act case); id. at 1155 (exclusively citing Missouri 
contract law on contractual interpretation issue in a Miller Act case); Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 
111 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting, after applying state law as a matter of discretion, that ―we 
clearly, and repeatedly, [have] stated prejudgment interest awards on Miller Act claims are governed 
by federal law, not state law‖). The Ninth Circuit provides a cogent exegesis in this regard:  
Although the Supreme Court found in F. D. Rich that resort to state law [regarding attorney‘s 
fees] would conflict with federal policies toward awarding attorneys‘ fees, the Court has also 
held that when no such policy conflict exists, the federal courts may look to state law in 
fashioning substantive federal rules. This is particularly appropriate where, as here, the 
applicable state law reflects general contract principles. 
United States ex rel. A. V. DeBlasio Constr., Inc. v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259, 262 
n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 
(1957), as authority to create federal common law by incorporating state contract law). 
 221. United States ex rel. Endicott Enters. Inc. v. Star Brite Constr. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 
(D. Del. 1994); see also United States ex rel. Pertun Constr. Co. v. Harvesters Grp., Inc., 918 F.2d 915, 
919 (11th Cir. 1990) (―Although this action was brought under the Miller Act, the effect and validity 
of the contractual clause purportedly limiting the subcontractor‘s remedy for delay is governed by the 
law of Florida, the state in which the agreement was executed and was to be performed.‖); United 
States ex rel. M-CO Constr., Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1987) (―In a 
Miller Act case, state law determines the amount of damages a subcontractor may receive.‖); United 
States ex rel. Benefit of Aucoin Elec. Supply Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 555 F.2d 535, 541 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (―In this aspect [whether there was a material breach], Texas law would be applicable. The 
issue does not involve any construction of the Miller Act, to which federal law would apply, but 
involves performance in Texas of a contract made in Texas.‖); United States ex rel. Greenmoor, Inc. v. 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 06-234, 2007 WL 2071651, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) 
(―Congress provided that the United States district courts have ‗exclusive federal question jurisdiction‘ 
for actions under the Miller Act. . . . [H]owever, the underlying breach of contract claims that form the 
basis of the Miller Act claim will be determined on the basis of state law.‖). 
 222. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972) (concluding that federal 
question ―jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1218 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1177 
 
 
 
 
declaratory authority, Miller Act cases would fall directly into the 
jurisdictional bar imposed by the Shoshone line of cases because they 
would seek federal question jurisdiction over a federal statutory cause of 
action coupled with a mandatory cross-reference to state-law rights.
223
 As 
a result of adopting a mandatory view of the cross-reference to state law 
under the Miller Act, courts would, in cases lacking diversity, be forced to 
rely upon the United States as a party to provide jurisdiction for Miller Act 
cases.
224
 This finding further supports the notion that federal question 
jurisdiction requires that the federal courts retain declaratory power over 
the substantive rights of the case at issue. 
3. Federal Common Law Type I 
Federal courts often cross-reference state law in federal common law 
suits as well. I define federal common law, pursuant to the standard 
view,
225
 as ―federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced 
directly by traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or 
constitutional commands.‖226 The federal courts cross-reference in these 
cases in the following manner. If the issue of federal common law 
empowers a plaintiff to bring suit,
227
 then the courts find that federal law 
creates the cause of action.
228
 The content of the right, however, need not 
necessarily be federal.
229
 Thus, the federal courts may rely upon pre-Erie 
 
 
 223. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Shoshone). 
 224. This is the case because United States as a party jurisdiction does not require that the 
governing law be federal. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) 
(―The federal jurisdictional grant over suits brought by the United States is not in itself a mandate for 
applying federal law in all circumstances. This principle follows from Erie itself, where, although the 
federal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases, we held that the federal courts did not possess the 
power to develop a concomitant body of general federal law.‖). 
 225. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 585, 590–94 (2006) (presenting this as the standard definition).  
 226. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 607. There are at least three competing views of 
federal common law. See, e.g., Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 225, at 590–94 (discussing three 
definitions of federal common law). The narrowest view finds that federal common law is merely a 
listing of those enclaves where the Court has employed the use of federal common law in the past. Id. 
On the broad side, federal common law is thought by some to include ―any rule of federal law created 
by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments—
constitutional or congressional.‖ Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common 
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted).  
 227. Much federal common law does not create a cause of action, but rather creates a defense, a 
rule of preclusion, or the like. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (creating federal common 
law of preclusion); Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (creating federal common law 
government contractor defense). 
 228. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 (1991). 
 229. Id. at 98. 
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federal common law to provide the right,
230
 or craft a federal right 
afresh.
231
 But often the federal courts rely upon a discretionary cross-
reference to state-law rights in crafting a rule to couple to the federal cause 
of action.
232
 Such discretionary cross-references differ from mandatory 
and metadiscretionary cross-references
233
 insofar as the court is not bound 
to apply the law of the state in which the federal court sits, but rather the 
court views the cross-reference as one to the common law as a 
generality.
234
 Nor is the federal court bound to adopt state law at all in this 
context. Rather, the federal courts truly are crafting rights here,
235
 relying 
upon the cross-reference to state law as more an informative act—a search 
for best practices
236—rather than a search for binding precedent.237 Or put 
 
 
 230. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (―[W]hile the 
federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson . . . represented 
general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it 
nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these 
federal questions.‖); see also Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 448–50 (1948) (applying the federal 
law defined in the pre-Erie cases as to liability of railroads to those riding on free passes); Nat‘l Metro. 
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 457 (1945) (similar). 
 231. See Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (creating federal common law government contractor defense). 
 232. See, e.g., Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893 & n.6 (cross-referencing general state law preclusion 
principles, as embodied in Restatements, to create federal common law of preclusion); Priebe & Sons, 
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (―It is customary, where Congress has not adopted a 
different standard, to apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of general 
contract law.‖); Studio Frames Ltd. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2007) (cross-
referencing the general principles of state insurance law); Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 
F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir. 2006) (cross-referencing general common law of contracts to provide the 
federal rule of decision in federal common law of contracts); Ruttenberg v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 413 
F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 2005) (cross-referencing general contract law principles as rule of decision in 
federal common law case); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying 
―federal common law[, which] incorporates general principles of contract . . . law‖). 
 233. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing metadiscretionary cross-references to state-law rights in the 
federal common law context). 
 234. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank v. Small Bus. Admin., 868 F.2d 340, 343 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(cross-referencing the general principles of contract law found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS instead of the particular law of the forum state); Young, supra note 50, at 1651 (arguing 
that purely discretionary incorporation of state law is not bound by the rules of the forum state). 
 235. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (―But state law, 
if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best 
effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and 
will not be an independent source of private rights.‖); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 366–67 (1943) (holding that once federal competence is recognized, ―it is for the federal courts to 
fashion the governing rule according to their own standards‖); D‘Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 
U.S. 447, 471–72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (similar). 
 236. See, e.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1962) (refusing to cross-reference state law 
because it produced poor consequences by unduly restricting the use of marital funds in purchasing 
government bonds). 
 237. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (holding in the context of state cross-
references to federal law that ―[i]f a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it 
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differently, the federal courts, in federal common law type I cases 
deploying discretionary cross-references to state law, are fully exercising 
their declaratory authority to craft legal norms.
238
  
Coinciding with this interpretive power, one finds that discretionary 
cross-references to state-law rights arise under federal question 
jurisdiction. These cases, then, are akin to Tucker Act suits insofar as they 
present federal causes of action coupled with discretionary cross-
references to state-law rights. Federal common law type I cases, like 
Tucker Act cases, often need not rely upon federal question jurisdiction to 
enter federal court.
239
 There are, however, certain categories of suits that 
 
 
would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then . . . the federal cases are being used only for the 
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached‖). 
 238. This exercise of authority is often equated with legislative function. See, e.g., O‘Melveny & 
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (holding that the weighing of factors in the proposed creation 
of federal common law is more appropriately a legislative function); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Trans. 
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981) (same); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 531–32 (1988) (Stevens J., dissenting) (―But when we are asked to create an entirely new 
doctrine—to answer ‗questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken‘—we have a special duty 
to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper decision. When the novel 
question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a 
massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual—whether in the 
social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context—I feel very 
deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress.‖ (citation omitted)); Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. at 457 (holding that in fashioning federal common law, ―[t]he range of judicial inventiveness will 
be determined by the nature of the problem‖); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511–13 (1954) 
(similar); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979–81 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, 
J., concurring) (arguing that creating a federal common law reporter‘s privilege is essentially a 
legislative task), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005), modified, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Henry 
P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1975) (―Thus, when a federal court announces a federal rule of decision in an area of 
plenary congressional competence, it exercises an initiative normally left to Congress, ousts state law, 
and yet acts without the political checks on national power created by state representation in 
Congress.‖); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 766–67 (1989) (arguing that 
federal common law, as it is essentially a legislative function, violates separation of powers 
principles). 
 239. Federal common law cases fall roughly into six categories. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 
225, at 594. These categories are (1) cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United States, see, 
e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (involving ―[t]he rights and duties 
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues‖); (2) cases involving interstate 
controversies, see, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 518–19 (1936) (involving Oregon‘s 
diversion of the Walla Walla River to the alleged detriment of the residents of Washington); (3) cases 
that call upon the court to make substantive judgments regarding international relations, see, e.g., 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (involving a contract for the purchase 
of Cuban sugar between American and Cuban companies); (4) cases arising in admiralty, see, e.g., 
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 445 (1994) (involving a personal injury action brought by 
seaman injured on the job); (5) cases creating federal defenses to state-law claims, see, e.g., Boyle v. 
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988) (involving a suit brought after a military helicopter 
copilot was killed in a helicopter crash during a military training exercise); and (6) cases where the 
Erie doctrine requires the adoption of a federal rule of decision, see, e.g., Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. 
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would not be heard in federal court without federal question jurisdiction. 
For example, the rights and obligations of the United States, which are 
governed by federal common law, can apply in cases in which the United 
States is not a party and thus arise under § 1331.
240
 Interstate 
controversies, which are governed by federal common law, can arise in a 
suit that does not feature two states directly litigating against each other 
and thus arise under § 1331.
241
 Finally, plaintiffs may seek to enforce a 
right created by the federal common law of foreign relations and use 
§ 1331 as the basis for federal jurisdiction.
242
 It is settled law that such 
federal common law type I suits, which coincide with a full-throated use 
of the courts‘ declaratory authority, do raise both statutory and Article III 
federal questions.
243
 
4. State-Law Discretionary Cross-References to Federal Law 
As is the case with mandatory cross-references, the federal courts take 
a mirror-image approach to vesting discretionary state-law cross-
references to federal rights, holding that federal jurisdiction does not arise 
in these cases. As with the discussions above, this lack of federal question 
jurisdiction coincides with a lack of declaratory authority. 
State courts often interpret state law by a discretionary cross-reference 
to analogous federal rights. This discretionary cross-referencing frequently 
 
 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 499 (2001) (involving the preclusive effect of federal 
dismissal). Many of these groupings are inapposite to this discussion as they do not rely upon federal 
question jurisdictional authority to enter federal court. For example, cases affecting the rights and 
obligations of the United States typically feature the United States as a party and take jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345–1347, 1491 (2006). Interstate controversies, which typically feature two or 
more states suing each other, arise under the Supreme Court‘s exclusive and original jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). Most admiralty cases arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
Finally, the creation of a substantive rule of decision under the Erie doctrine, by definition, must arise 
under diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
 240. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 682 (2006) 
(involving ―the proper forum for reimbursement claims‖ when an injured federal employee recovers 
medical expenses, paid by insurer, from a third party). 
 241. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) (involving an action brought 
by the state of Illinois against four Wisconsin cities and two sewerage commissions). 
 242. Cf. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003) (defendant corporation sought 
removal to federal court ―arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-
question jurisdiction under § 1331‖); see also Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: 
Preventing the Misuse of Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private 
Transnational Litigation, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2408 (2002) (discussing federal question jurisdiction 
over federal common law of foreign affairs suits). 
 243. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 99–100 (concluding that ―§ 1331 jurisdiction will 
support claims founded upon federal common law‖). 
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comes into play in constructing state statutes.
244
 Additionally, the state 
courts often discretionarily cross-reference federal constitutional law in 
interpreting their state constitutions.
245
 In both settings, the courts are 
coupling state-law causes of action with a discretionary cross-reference to 
a federal law right. Moreover, these discretionary cross-references, unlike 
mandatory or metadiscretionary cross-references, are not quests for 
binding precedent to be found in federal law, but rather searches for 
informed practices.
246
 Thus, the state courts here, although cross-
referencing federal rights, are fully exercising their prerogatives to retain 
control over the content of state law.
247
 
This full expression of declaratory power by the state courts in these 
discretionary cross-references to federal law stands side-by-side with a 
lack of statutory or constitutional federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, 
such discretionary cross-references to federal law do not give rise to 
§ 1331 jurisdiction.
248
 Nor will the Court take jurisdiction over such 
discretionary cross-references to federal law on certiorari from the state 
court systems.
249
 Moreover, the federal courts lack constitutional 
 
 
 244. See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson of Middletown, LLC v. Conn. Hous. Fin. Auth., 986 A.2d 271, 
277 (Conn. 2010) (―[G]iven the similar purposes of both the federal and state agencies . . . the 
defendant . . . reasonably relied on 12 U.S.C. § 4108 and 24 C.F.R. § 248.141(c)(1) in interpreting the 
language of [Connecticut Code] § 8-253a(1)(B).‖); Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 
492, 495 (Ky. 2005) (―This Court has consistently interpreted the civil rights provisions of KRS 
Chapter 344 consistent with the applicable federal anti-discrimination laws.‖); Tomlinson v. State, 878 
P.2d 311, 313–14 (Nev. 1994) (―To give all the subsections of NRS 52.255 independent meaning, we 
accept the State‘s construction and interpret NRS 52.255 consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 
1004.‖); Daily Gazette Co. v. W. Va. Devel. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 191 (W. Va. 1996) (―Though we 
recognize that the deliberative process privilege language of federal Exemption 5 differs from that of 
WVFOIA Exemption 8, we nevertheless interpret the latter to be consistent with the former.‖); see 
also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. 1990) (noting that ―uniformity in interpretation 
of our rules and the federal rules is highly desirable‖). 
 245. See infra note 288 (listing examples of discretionary state-law cross-references to federal 
equal protection doctrine). 
 246. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 878 n.6 (Iowa 2009) (―Plaintiffs‘ challenge . . . 
is based on the equal protection guarantee in the Iowa Constitution and does not implicate federal 
constitutional protections. Generally, we view the federal and state equal protection clauses as 
identical in scope, import, and purpose. At the same time, we have jealously guarded our right to . . . 
independently apply the federally formulated principles. Here again, we find federal precedent 
instructive in interpreting the Iowa Constitution, but we refuse to follow it blindly.‖ (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 247. The state supreme courts are the final binding authority on matters of state law; their 
decisions bind the federal courts in this regard. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 
(1992); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 248. See, e.g., Nuclear Eng‘g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1981) (―[S]tate law 
incorporation of federal law does not . . . allow . . . state law claims to be construed as essentially 
federal in character.‖); 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 3563 nn.19–21 (same and listing cases). 
 249. See, e.g., 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 4031 (―It does not seem likely that the Court 
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jurisdiction here as well. Because the state court cross-references are truly 
interpretations of state law, the federal courts lack binding, declaratory 
power over the cross-referenced law.
250
 Thus, any construction of federal 
law the federal courts would render in such a discretionary cross-
referenced case would be merely advisory, contrary to the dictates of 
Article III.
251
  
C. Metadiscretionary Cross-References 
I turn finally to metadiscretionary cross-references. A 
metadiscretionary cross-reference is one in which the forum court is not 
constrained by a rule of law to apply the cross-referenced law, but it 
nevertheless treats the cross-reference as if it were so bound.
252
 I begin 
with enclave jurisdiction, where the Court has held that there is a 
constitutional default rule that state law governs—that is, a 
metadiscretionary cross-reference to state law absent congressional 
action—and that federal question jurisdiction lies. Second, I look, once 
again, at federal common law cases, but in this instance focusing upon 
those cases that take federal question jurisdiction and presume the forum 
state‘s law applies absent preemption by federal interest (i.e., a 
metadiscretionary cross-reference). I end with a discussion of federal 
question jurisdiction over state metadiscretionary cross-references to 
federal law under Michigan v. Long.
253
 Here, once again, we find the 
overlapping of declaratory authority over the cross-referenced law and 
federal question jurisdiction. 
 
 
could be persuaded that it has jurisdiction to review application of a state rule of civil procedure 
merely because the state rule is taken verbatim from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not even if the 
state courts have made it clear that their overriding purpose is to establish perfect uniformity with the 
practice followed in the federal courts in their state.‖). 
 250. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (―If a state court chooses merely to rely on 
federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear 
by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the 
purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached.‖). 
 251. Id. at 1042 (―The jurisdictional concern is that we not ‗render an advisory opinion, and if the 
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our 
review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.‘‖ (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 
117, 125 (1945))). 
 252. See supra Part II.B (defining metadiscretionary cross-references). 
 253. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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1. Enclave Jurisdiction 
First, I examine the cross-referencing of state law in federal enclaves. 
The Constitution grants Congress unfettered legislative jurisdiction over 
so-called federal enclaves, portions of land ceded by states to the federal 
government for the construction of federal installations.
254
 Congress 
governs these enclaves, even those subject to exclusive federal control, 
predominately by cross-reference to state law, having done so by statute in 
the case of criminal law
255
 and typically by constitutional presumption of 
cross-reference to state law in civil suits.
256
 I will focus upon civil law in 
this discussion because criminal law cases may rely upon the United States 
as a party to provide Article III jurisdiction, thereby abrogating the need 
for a federal question to support jurisdiction.
257
 
The Court has announced three competing theories on the 
constitutional presumption in favor of cross-referencing state civil law in 
federal enclaves.
258
 Under the first theory, when real property becomes a 
federal enclave, the local law in effect at the time of the transfer to the 
federal government continues to apply until it is abrogated by federal 
 
 
 254. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (permitting the federal government to set up enclaves within 
states, if the relevant state legislature grants consent). Due to the circumstances of the cessation of the 
land at issue, federal enclaves come in four varieties. The federal government may hold (1) exclusive 
authority over the area, (2) authority concurrently with the state, (3) authority limited to particular 
subjects, or (4) no authority, but rather hold property as a normal proprietor. See Goldberg-Ambrose, 
supra note 67, at 554 n.73. 
 255. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006) (cross-referencing state criminal law as the operative law 
in federal enclaves). 
 256. See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99–100 (1940) (―The Constitution does 
not command that every vestige of the laws of the former sovereignty [in federal enclaves] must 
vanish. On the contrary its language has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until 
abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of 
the occupants of the territory transferred.‖). There are, however, several areas of civil law where 
Congress has passed specific statutory regulation. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (cross-referencing 
state wrongful death law into federal enclaves); Stephen E. Castlen & Gregory O. Block, Exclusive 
Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 123–24 (1997) (providing a 
comprehensive set of examples). 
 257. There is an argument to be made, also, especially in the case of statutory cross-referencing to 
state law in federal enclaves, that the cross-reference is of a discretionary nature, as opposed to 
metadiscretionary, because the federal courts retain interpretive power to veer from state precedent. 
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 67, at 555–56. I believe this to be the case. Thus, one could 
properly categorize these statutory, enclave cross-references as discretionary. In this section, however, 
I am not focusing on those instances of statutory cases, but rather on those instances where Congress 
has not acted and the federal courts cross-reference state law by constitutional presumption. 
 258. See Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.P.R. 1998) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not reconciled these competing holdings); Michael J. Malinowski, Federal 
Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a Domestic Violence Exception to Exclusive Legislative 
Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189, 192–96 (1990) (providing an overview of the Court‘s three theories 
of enclave jurisdiction).  
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law.
259
 Under this view, then, the cross-reference to state law is a static 
one, leaving the federal courts free to make postcessation interpretations of 
the incorporated law without reference to later in time developments in 
state law.
260
 Under the second theory, state law is incorporated at the time 
of cessation to the federal government, and subsequent changes in state 
law that are part of ―the same basic scheme‖ as the state law at the time of 
transfer apply to the rule of decision.
261
 Thus, the federal cross-reference 
to state law is not entirely static under this theory, but continues to 
develop, within areas extant at the time of the property transfer, as the 
state law develops.
262
 Under the third theory, absent congressional action 
to the contrary, all state law of the state in which the federal enclave 
resides, regardless of when it was passed, is applicable within the enclave 
unless it interferes with the federal government‘s constitutional legislative 
jurisdiction over the enclave.
263
 Although the Court has yet to rule on 
which theory takes precedence,
264
 this final view is most commonly 
adopted by the lower courts and likely most consistent with the Framers‘ 
original intent.
265
 
Civil jurisdiction in federal enclaves maps onto my analytical terms in 
the following manner. Under the majority view, the cross-reference to 
state law lacks a mandatory nature, insofar as the decision to cross-
reference, at least in the first instance, was not legislatively imposed.
266
 
Nevertheless, these cases lack important features of discretionary cross-
references because the federal courts, absent preemption, do not have 
discretion to adopt any rule of decision other than the law of the state in 
which the federal enclave resides. Pursuant to the majority view, then, 
enclave jurisdiction constitutes a constitutional default rule creating a 
metadiscretionary
267
 cross-reference to state-law causes of action and 
rights, because one finds a onetime exercise of judicial discretion followed 
by a mandatory-like regime thereafter (i.e., excepting federal interest 
 
 
 259. See Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100; Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 
546 (1885). 
 260. See Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 328 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 261. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 269 (1963). 
 262. See Kelly, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 4. 
 263. Howard v. Comm‘rs of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626–27 
(1953). 
 264. See Kelly, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 4. 
 265. See Castlen & Block, supra note 256, at 123 (concluding that the third theory of enclave 
jurisdiction cross-referencing is most consistent with the Framers‘ intent); Malinowski, supra note 
258, at 195 (noting the third view as the most adopted approach).  
 266. See supra Part II.B (defining metadiscretionary cross-references). 
 267. See supra Part II.B. 
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preemption, the law of the forum state invariably applies).
268
 Coinciding 
with this exercise (albeit limited) of declaratory authority, the courts 
universally note that they have federal question jurisdiction over these 
claims.
269
  
2. Federal Common Law Rights Type II 
As discussed above, cross-referencing of state law often occurs in 
federal common law suits (i.e., cases relying upon a ―federal rule[] of 
decision whose content cannot be directly traced by traditional methods of 
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands‖).270 Again, 
if the issue of federal common law empowers a plaintiff to bring suit,
271
 
then the Court finds that federal law creates the cause of action.
272
  
While the content of the right may be federal,
273
 the courts quite often 
fill this void with a cross-reference to state law.
274
 Although these cross-
references may be conducted discretionarily,
275
 the Court, at least since 
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
276
 has favored a metadiscretionary 
approach. Under this view, absent a strong showing of federal interest 
preemption, the law of the forum state supplies the content of the right at 
issue.
277
 Moreover, this presumption-absent-preemption approach is 
especially strong in those instances where the rights of private parties, as 
opposed to the United States directly, are at issue.
278
 This strengthened 
 
 
 268. See supra Part II.B (noting that even in mandatory cross-referencing, just as in the use of 
state law under Erie, state law may be preempted by overriding federal interests). 
 269. See, e.g., Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250–51 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that because the alleged tort of exposure to asbestos occurred on federal enclave, it invoked 
federal question jurisdiction under § 1331); Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 328 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(similar). 
 270. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 53, at 607; see also supra note 226.  
 271. See supra note 227. 
 272. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 (1991). 
 273. See supra notes 231–32 (citing cases). 
 274. See, e.g., Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (―For a variety of reasons 
having mainly to do with the paucity of federal common law rules and the desirability of keeping the 
law as simple as possible, federal courts asked to make federal common law do so usually by adopting 
state law.‖). 
 275. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing federal common law and discretionary cross-references). 
 276. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
 277. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (holding that federal courts should ―incorporat[e] [state 
law] as the federal rule of decision,‖ unless ―application of [the particular] state law [in question] 
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs‖); see also Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 
(describing this as a presumption); 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 4518 n.17 (describing this 
presumption approach as the recent trend); id. § 4518 nn.31–32 (listing cases demonstrating federal 
interest needed to avoid cross-reference to state law); id. § 4518 n.33–38 (exhaustively listing cases 
cross-referencing state law as a matter of presumption). 
 278. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 (―The presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal 
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presumption, then, results in an especially mandatory-like cross-reference 
to state law in those cases where the presence of a federal question, 
because the United States or adversely situated states are not parties,
279
 
provides the sole ground for federal jurisdiction. 
As with enclave jurisdiction, federal common law cross-referencing 
under the Kimbell Foods approach is best described as metadiscretionary. 
Pursuant to this approach, the cross-reference to state law lacks a 
mandatory nature because the first-order choice of cross-referencing to 
state law remains one of judicial discretion.
280
 But these federal common 
law type II cases also lack the salient features of discretionary cross-
references as the courts, excepting federal interest preemption, lack 
discretion to adopt any rule of decision other than the law of the state in 
which the federal enclave resides.
281
 Kimbell Foods–type federal common 
law cases, then, create judicially crafted federal causes of action coupled 
with metadiscretionary
282
 cross-references to state-law rights, to which the 
courts—focusing upon the first-order discretionary choice—take federal 
question jurisdiction.
283
  
3. Michigan v. Long 
Finally, I turn to the interplay of metadiscretionary cross-references by 
state courts to federal law and federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme 
Court, by statute, may only hear cases from the state courts that involve 
federal issues.
284
 Moreover, in granting certiorari, § 1257 limits the Court 
to the issues presented from these cases that are questions of federal law, 
because the state high courts are the authoritative expositors of state 
law.
285
 These relatively straightforward propositions have created 
difficulty, however, in cases where state law cross-references federal law.  
 
 
common law is particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships 
with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards.‖). 
 279. See supra note 239 (discussing the use of federal common law under differing fonts of 
jurisdiction). 
 280. See supra Part II.B (defining mandatory cross-references). 
 281. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (noting that even in mandatory cross-
referencing, just as in the use of state law under Erie, state law may be preempted by overriding 
federal interests). 
 282. See supra Part II.B (defining metadiscretionary cross-references). 
 283. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972) (a federal common law claim 
constitutes ―a question arising under the laws of the United States‖ (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 
236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971))). 
 284. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006). 
 285. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 914–16 (1997) (―Neither this Court nor any other 
federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one 
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Take equal protection jurisprudence, for example.
286
 Many states 
interpret state constitutional equal protection provisions, which are 
nominally distinct bodies of law from the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
applying federal equal protection analysis unerringly (i.e., in a 
metadiscretionary manner).
287
 Some states, while deploying the federal 
two-step equal protection analysis, insist that they do so only as a matter 
of discretion and that they are free to depart from federal precedent.
288
 A 
final group of states deploys a different analysis altogether.
289
 This third 
 
 
rendered by the highest court of the state.‖); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (―We 
forthwith acknowledge . . . that this Court‘s ‗only power over state judgments is to correct them to the 
extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights.‘ . . . It follows that the decision of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine is subject to disturbance here only to the extent that it fails to honor federal 
rights and duties.‖ (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945))); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 
U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 633 (1874) (questions of state property law are beyond the statutory authority of 
the Supreme Court to entertain). 
 286. There are many other areas of law facing the same problem. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of 
Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 10 (1990) (state law cross-referenced the First Amendment); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 132 (1987) (state law cross-referenced the Airport and Airway 
Improvement Act of 1982). 
 287. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 210 (Mo. 2006) (holding that it applies the 
same analysis for both federal and state equal protection challenges); Follansbee v. Plymouth Dist. 
Court, 856 A.2d 740, 742 (N.H. 2004) (holding that state equal protection provisions are to be 
construed in harmony with federal equal protection); Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 
S.W.3d 509, 518 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that the court had ―consistently held that the state equal 
protection guarantee is co-extensive with the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution‖); Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 
(Tex. 2002) (―[T]he federal analytical approach applies to equal protection challenges under the Texas 
Constitution.‖); State v. Manussier, 921 P.2d 473, 482 (Wash. 1996) (―This court has consistently 
construed the federal and state equal protection clauses identically and considered claims arising under 
their scope as one issue.‖); Nankin v. Vill. of Shorewood, 630 N.W.2d 141, 146 n.5 (Wis. 2001) 
(―This court applies the same interpretation to the state Equal Protection Clause as that given to the 
equivalent federal provision.‖ (quoting Castellani v. Bailey, 578 N.W.2d 166, 174 (Wis. 1998))). 
 288. See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 130 (Cal. 2009) (―California‘s equal protection 
doctrine has not been confined to that of federal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence: ‗[O]ur state 
equal protection provisions . . . are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may 
demand an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were 
applicable.‘‖ (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950 (Cal. 1976))); City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 
778 A.2d 77, 87 (Conn. 2001) (―Although we previously have stated that the equal protection 
provision under our state constitution provides the same limitations as the federal equal protection 
provision . . . we note here . . . that this does not mean that ‗the state equal protection provision can 
never have an independent meaning from the equal protection provision in the federal constitution.‘‖ 
(citations omitted)); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 878 n.6 (Iowa 2009) (―Plaintiffs‘ challenge 
. . . is based on the equal protection guarantee in the Iowa Constitution and does not implicate federal 
constitutional protections. Generally, we view the federal and state equal protection clauses as 
identical in scope, import, and purpose. At the same time, we have jealously guarded our right to . . . 
independently apply the federally formulated principles. Here again, we find federal precedent 
instructive in interpreting the Iowa Constitution, but we refuse to follow it blindly.‖ (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 289. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Revenue v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 629 (Alaska 1993) (―Analysis under our 
state equal protection clause is considerably more fluid than under its federal counterpart. Instead of 
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category of cases clearly does not raise a federal question sufficient to vest 
the Supreme Court with statutory jurisdiction, even if the state court 
offered federal equal protection law as an alternative ground for its ruling, 
because state law provides an adequate and independent ground for the 
ruling.
290
 
The first and second categories, however, raise more difficult 
jurisdictional questions because the state high courts in both instances are 
cross-referencing federal constitutional law. The Supreme Court took up 
this issue in Michigan v. Long.
291
 In Long, the Michigan Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction on the reasoning that the police stop at issue could 
not be justified on Fourth Amendment, or analogous state constitutional, 
grounds.
292
 In rendering the state-law holding, however, the Michigan high 
court relied almost exclusively upon cross-references to federal law.
293
 To 
make matters worse, it was not clear to the Supreme Court
294
 whether the 
Michigan Supreme Court‘s cross-references to federal law were made in a 
discretionary or metadiscretionary manner.
295
 
The Long Court approached the issue in two stages. First, it held that 
its jurisdiction rested upon the force with which the cross-reference to 
federal law was made. Thus, when a state court merely discretionarily 
cross-references federal law, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the cross-
 
 
using three levels of scrutiny, we apply a sliding scale . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)); Sibley v. Bd. of 
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985) (holding that the federal three-tier 
system of constitutional scrutiny was an inappropriate model for the interpretation and application of 
the State‘s equal protection provision); Twp. of Casco v. Sec‘y of State, 701 N.W.2d 102, 123 n.83 
(Mich. 2005) (―It is important to note that the text of our state Equal Protection Clause is not entirely 
the same as its federal counterpart . . . . Therefore, it is insufficient for defendants to rely solely on 
federal case law regarding vote dilution, or Michigan cases interpreting the federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and then boldly announce that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 provides the same protections against 
vote dilution as U.S. Const., Am. XIV.‖); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 212 n.13 (N.J. 2006) (―Our 
state equal protection analysis differs from the more rigid, three-tiered federal equal protection 
methodology.‖); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878 (Vt. 1999) (―Accordingly, we conclude that this 
approach, rather than the rigid, multi-tiered analysis evolved by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, shall direct our inquiry under Article 7 [of the Vermont Constitution].‖). 
 290. The Supreme Court is empowered to make this determination, however. See Fox Film Corp. 
v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (―[W]here the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, 
one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal 
ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.‖). 
 291. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 292. Id. at 1036–37. 
 293. Id. at 1043–44. 
 294. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467–68 (2005) (holding state court 
characterization of cross-references not binding on the Supreme Court); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 
183, 189 (1947) (―But whether the claims are based on a federal right or are merely of local concern is 
itself a federal question on which this Court, and not the Supreme Court of North Carolina, has the last 
say.‖); see also Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 29 (1999) (certifying question to state high court). 
 295. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040–41. 
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referenced issue.
296
 The Court justified this rule, in part, upon Article III‘s 
prohibition upon issuing advisory opinions,
297
 thus holding that 
jurisdiction in federal question cases rides on the ability to authoritatively 
declare law. On the other hand, where the state cross-references to federal 
law are such that the state court ―felt compelled by what it understood to 
be federal constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the 
manner it did,‖ then jurisdiction lies.298 That is to say, if the state court 
cross-referenced federal law either mandatorily or metadiscretionarily, the 
Court would take federal question jurisdiction precisely because the 
Supreme Court holds declaratory authority in such circumstances. 
Secondly, the Court held that, absent a clear statement from the state court 
to the contrary, it would presume that any cross-reference to federal law 
was a nondiscretionary one.
299
 Thus, the Court here focuses upon the 
mandatory aspect of metadiscretion, as opposed to the discretionary 
aspect, to ground federal question jurisdiction. 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED BY MIXING IT UP 
In the preceding Part, I argued that in cross-referenced regimes, federal 
question jurisdiction invariably coincides with federal judicial capacity to 
declare the content of the cross-referenced law. Thus, in the case of federal 
cross-references to state-law rights, federal question jurisdiction lies when 
the cross-reference is not mandatory. Conversely, in the case of state 
cross-references to federal law, federal question jurisdiction lies when the 
cross-reference to a federal-law right is not discretionary. Although these 
cross-referenced regimes are not the heartland of federal question 
jurisdiction cases, the findings made above, I contend, offer substantial 
insights into the nature of federal question jurisdiction more generally. 
First, these findings demonstrate, contrary to the standard view, that the 
federal courts will not stand ready to hear claims under federal question 
 
 
 296. Id. at 1041 (―If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the 
precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment 
or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not 
themselves compel the result that the court has reached.‖). 
 297. Id. at 1040 (―Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering 
advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court‘s refusal to decide cases where there is an 
adequate and independent state ground.‖); id. at 1042 (―The jurisdictional concern is that we not 
‗render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we 
corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory 
opinion.‘‖ (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945))). 
 298. Id. at 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 299. Id. at 1040–41. 
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jurisdiction without the concomitant power to declare law. This narrower 
conception of the scope of federal question jurisdiction, moreover, 
comports with the original understanding of Article III arising under 
jurisdiction and with the notion of juridical independence. Second, this 
review of the Court‘s handling of cross-referenced regimes demonstrates 
its propensity to rely upon formal distinctions that often lack functional 
differences to support federal question jurisdiction, which itself raises 
significant separation of powers difficulties.  
A. No Federal Question Jurisdiction Without the Power to Declare Law 
The first lesson to be learned from this study of cross-referenced cases 
is that the courts insist that federal question jurisdiction be linked, at least 
from a departmental perspective, with the power to declare the legal 
content of the law at issue. Professor Mishkin, in one of his many 
canonical pieces, argued that one of the primary purposes of federal 
question jurisdiction in the district court is to vindicate federal rights, 
which often require a hospitable forum to resolve factual issues without 
the need to resolve questions of law.
300
 Thus, he contended that federal 
question jurisdiction should be conceived of as jurisdiction over ―federal 
claims,‖ not federal legal questions, so as to highlight this purely fact-
finding purpose.
301
 Professor Mishkin‘s view has come to be the standard 
jurisprudential position.
302
 The argument advanced above, that the federal 
courts refuse federal question jurisdiction when they lack authoritative 
power to declare law, challenges the soundness of Professor Mishkin‘s 
claim.  
Professor Mishkin‘s view is susceptible to two interpretations—one 
sweeping and one narrow—both of which run afoul of the Court‘s 
treatment of federal questions in the cross-referenced context. On the 
sweeping end, Professor Vázquez recently advocated that, following 
Professor Mishkin‘s ―claim‖ approach to federal question jurisdiction, 
Congress should be empowered to couple federal causes of action to 
mandatory cross-references to state-law rights.
303
 Under this view, because 
 
 
 300. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 169–76. 
 301. Id. at 171. 
 302. See, e.g., Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Mishkin as 
defining the purpose for federal question jurisdiction); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist 
Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1515 (2007) (stating that 
Mishkin‘s views of federal question jurisdiction have dominated and transformed the area for fifty 
years). 
 303. Vázquez, supra note 20, at 1756–57 (arguing that despite the mere formal nature of the 
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one core purpose of federal question jurisdiction is to hear federal 
―claims‖ (i.e., only fact-bound suits), Congress may vest federal question 
jurisdiction over certain claims and simultaneously direct that the federal 
judiciary as a whole department lacks declaratory authority over the legal 
content of the cross-referenced rights at issue.
304
 By this, I mean that no 
federal court at any point in the litigation process would possess the power 
to declare authoritatively the cross-referenced law. 
As I illustrated above, the Court uniformly rejects this conception of 
federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court consistently rejects federal 
question jurisdiction unless it retains the discretionary or 
metadiscretionary power to declare the legal content of the cross-
referenced legal norms.
305
 Even in the case of metadiscretionary cross-
references, where the lower federal courts lack discretion (absent federal 
interest preemption) to avoid the law of the forum state, the federal courts 
rely upon the first-order discretionary choice of the department as a whole 
to provide the foundation for federal question jurisdiction.
306
 Thus, this 
sweeping formulation of Mishkin‘s federal-claim approach to federal 
question jurisdiction lacks doctrinal footing on both the statutory and 
constitutional level.
307
 Put affirmatively, this study of cross-referenced 
regimes illustrates that federal question jurisdiction requires the presence 
of authority to declare the content of the cross-referenced law in the 
judicial department as a whole—even if, after questions of law become 
settled, the only live issues in the lower federal courts are fact-bound ones. 
One could make a less sweeping presentation of Professor Mishkin‘s 
federal-claim view, likely the better reading, that is compatible with the 
notion that, from a departmental perspective, federal question jurisdiction 
requires declaratory authority to lie somewhere with the federal courts in 
order for federal question jurisdiction to arise. On this view, so long as 
there is a federal right as an ingredient to the case, the federal courts 
 
 
distinction, this ―formal‖ change is enough to vest Article III jurisdiction). 
 304. Id. at 1763 (―[F]ederal claim analysis tells us that Congress can confer jurisdiction over a 
category of federal claims for the purpose of making available a more (or less) hospitable forum. It is 
for this reason that federal jurisdiction is appropriate when federal law creates the right of action even 
when the case presents no dispute about the meaning or application of federal law. The desire to 
provide a more (or less) hospitable forum would appear to justify federal jurisdiction as well when 
Congress has the constitutional power to legislate on the subject but has no objection to existing law 
with respect to both substance and procedure.‖). 
 305. Compare supra Part III.A (arguing that congressional mandatory cross-references to state-
law rights without any other federal ingredient, such as a defense, lack federal question jurisdiction), 
with supra Parts III.B & III.C (arguing that the presence of discretion in the cross-reference coincides 
with federal question jurisdiction). 
 306. See supra Part III.C.1–2 (discussing the same). 
 307. See supra Part III.A (discussing mandatory cross-references to state law). 
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should stand ready to vindicate federal rights even in purely fact-bound 
cases.
308
  
At a statutory level, the Court‘s cross-referential holdings, however, do 
not fully square with this formulation of Mishkin‘s federal-claim view 
either. First, the district courts will not take § 1331 jurisdiction under 
Grable & Sons over a case where a state-law cause of action is coupled 
with a federal right unless the legal content of the federal right is at 
issue.
309
 That is, if the case rides merely on factual issues or state law, the 
federal courts will not take statutory federal question jurisdiction. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court would not likely hear such a case—one in 
which the parties were not contesting the content of federal law in a cross-
referenced regime—on certiorari under § 1257, because the judgment in 
such a suit would rest upon adequate and independent state grounds.
310
 
The Court lacks statutory jurisdiction to review state-law issues in this 
posture.
311
 Thus, even this narrow version of Mishkin‘s view fails to hold 
on statutory grounds.  
This is not to say that one could not formulate yet a third version of his 
position to account for the Court‘s recent cross-referential opinions.312 
Rather, I assert that these cross-referential cases, with their insistence upon 
declaratory authority over the cross-referenced law as a condition of 
vesting federal question jurisdiction, illustrate that the federal courts, while 
not entirely discounting the utility of providing a welcoming forum for 
fact-only adjudication, do not see this function as the core purpose of 
federal question jurisdiction. The lesson is, I contend, that the federal 
courts find adjudicating the legal content of federal rights closer to the 
core purpose of federal question jurisdiction, and will hear fact-only 
claims in federal question jurisdiction only when congressional intent to 
 
 
 308. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 170 (contrasting the roles that the district courts and Supreme 
Court play in relation to federal question jurisdiction). 
 309. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 175, 
204 (2010) (noting that jurisdiction under Grable & Sons requires a live controversy regarding the 
legal content of the embedded federal right); see also supra notes 180–89 and accompanying text 
(discussing Grable & Sons). 
 310. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (―[W]here the judgment of a state 
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our 
[statutory] jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and 
adequate to support the judgment.‖). 
 311. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 633 (1874) (questions of state property 
law are beyond the statutory authority of the Supreme Court to entertain). 
 312. Mishkin, supra note 19, at 164 (contending that factors beyond a federal cause of action may 
well, as with diversity jurisdiction, have been sound bases for § 1331 jurisdiction). 
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do so is overwhelming.
313
 And even then, federal courts will hear the 
claims only if the judicial department as a whole retains declaratory power 
over the rights at issue.
314
 
This finding that the courts only take federal question jurisdiction in 
cross-referenced regimes when they retain declaratory authority over the 
cross-referenced law comports with the original meaning of Article III 
arising under jurisdiction. The ratification-era Court held Article III arising 
under jurisdiction ―to mean that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction 
over cases in which an actual federal law was determinative of a right or 
title asserted in the proceeding before it.‖315 Indeed, the early federal 
courts did not meet Article III‘s ―arising under‖ language in a vacuum. 
English jurisdictional law deployed the term ―arising‖ from time to time, 
typically meaning that the action must rely upon the source of law from 
which it arises or the action must arise from a bounded physical 
territory.
316
 Moreover, the English courts had a developed law regarding 
how parties could proceed in courts of limited jurisdiction, which placed 
the burden on plaintiffs to establish the jurisdiction of the court.
317
 Early 
federal courts borrowed from this tradition to determine the meaning of 
Article III federal question jurisdiction.
318
 In so doing, the Marshall Court, 
before issuing Osborn, settled upon the notion that Article III federal 
 
 
 313. This greater congressional intent is found in those instances where there is a federal cause of 
action coupled with a federal right. See Mulligan, supra note 108, at 1726 (―These two components—
the federal right and cause of action—work in a teeter-totter manner in relation to congressional intent. 
That is to say, when there are other strong indicia of congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction 
such as the existence of a statutory cause of action, the plaintiff‘s assertion of a federal right may be 
quite weak. Conversely, when there are few other congressional indicia of an intent to vest § 1331 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a stronger allegation of a federal right in order for § 1331 
jurisdiction to lie.‖). 
 314. The vesting of both a federal substantive right and a federal cause of action will ensure at 
least departmental interpretive authority. See id. 
 315. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 
263, 269 (2007). 
 316. See, e.g., Hyde v. Cogan, [1781] 99 Eng. Rep. 445 (K.B.) 450 (Buller, J.) (describing a claim 
based upon ―the [statutory] clause upon which the case arises‖); Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 
201 (K.B.) 212 (describing a remedy as ―arising from‖ a statute); Beak v. Thyrwhit, [1688] 87 Eng. 
Rep. 124 (K.B.) (holding that cases that ―aris[e] upon the sea‖ must be tried in admiralty); 1 
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 562 (T. Cunningham ed., 6th ed., Dublin, 
Luke White 1793) (―Inferior Courts are bounded, in their original Creation, to Causes arising within 
such limited jurisdiction . . . .‖). 
 317. See Bellia, supra note 315, at 273–76 (surveying the pre-Constitution, English practice). 
 318. See id. at 272; see also Turner v. Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10–11 (1799) 
(construing diversity jurisdictional statute against the background of English jurisdictional law); 
Shedden v. Custis, 21 F. Cas. 1218, 1219 (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (No. 12,736) (Jay, Circuit Justice) (noting 
in a diversity case adopting English jurisdictional law that ―[t]he English practice has been rightly 
stated by the defendant‘s counsel, and those rules are more necessary to be observed here than there, 
on account of a difference of the general and state governments‖). 
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question jurisdiction requires that ―federal law created or protected the 
right or title‖ at issue.319 As discussed above, this original-meaning 
interpretation of Osborn conforms to the view that taking federal question 
jurisdiction requires that the federal courts retain declaratory power over a 
substantive federal right in the case.
320
 
Not only does the need for federal court declaratory power have an old 
pedigree, the Court‘s insistence upon declaratory power in order to vest 
federal question jurisdiction speaks to the judiciary‘s status as a coequal 
branch of government. The judiciary‘s status as an independent and 
coequal branch of government is predicated, in part, upon its ―duty . . . to 
say what the law is.‖321 Indeed, the ratification debates show that the 
purpose for federal question jurisdiction was to empower the judiciary to 
fulfill this key role as expositor of federal law.
322
 More contemporary 
holdings from the Court also link judicial independence with declaratory 
authority in cases arising under federal question jurisdiction. 
When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction 
under the ―judicial Power‖ of Article III of the Constitution . . . . the 
core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts‘ independent 
responsibility—independent from its coequal branches in the 
Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority 
of the several States—to interpret federal law.323  
 
 
 319. Bellia, supra note 315, at 328. Professor Bellia predominantly relies upon two cases here. 
First, Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 347–48 (1809), in which the Court finds a 
lack of federal question jurisdiction to hear a property claim under the Treaty of Paris ending the 
Revolutionary War because the treaty merely promises to recognize state-law property rights—if the 
treaty had created the property rights, then the suit would arise under the treaty. Second, Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821), in which the Court, in relation to the question of Article 
III federal question jurisdiction, held: ―A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as 
well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United States, 
whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either.‖ Id. 
 320. See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text (discussing this original-meaning 
interpretation of Osborn). 
 321. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 322. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(The ―true import [of the laws] as far as respects individuals, must . . . be ascertained by judicial 
determinations.‖); BRUTUS XIII (Feb. 21, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 428 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (―The proper province of the judicial power, in any government, is, as I 
conceive, to declare what is the law of the land.‖); Bellia, supra note 315, at 316 (commenting upon 
the ratification debates and concluding that ―[t]hose who attributed some specific meaning to the 
Arising Under Clause described it as giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases calling for the 
enforcement or explication of federal laws‖). 
 323. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378–79 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (quoting Justice Stevens‘s Williams opinion); Michael P. 
Allen, Congress and Terri Shiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. 
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As such, foisting federal question jurisdiction upon the courts without at 
least a departmental power to declare the underlying rights of the litigants 
would strike a blow against judicial independence and the courts‘ status as 
a coequal branch of government, by allowing Congress to strip them of 
this essential feature of judicial power in federal question cases—the 
power to declare what the law is.  
This is not to say that the federal courts necessarily lack judicial 
independence altogether when, in diversity jurisdiction or the like, they 
lack the power to declare law.
324
 Rather, the power to declare the law is a 
feature of judicial independence,
325
 and of course there are others that 
apply with equal force in non-federal-question cases.
326
 But in federal 
question jurisdiction cases, the power to declare the law has significant 
separation-of-powers ramifications that bolster this element‘s importance. 
As Hamilton argued in Federalist 80: ―If there are such things as political 
axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being co-
extensive with its legislature, may be ranked among the number.‖327 This 
means that the courts‘ power to declare the meaning of federal law 
represents an important check upon the power of Congress and the 
Executive to act extralegally.
328
 Diversity jurisdiction, however, is more 
rightly conceived of as a question of horizontal federalism, where the 
federal courts step in to provide a neutral forum.
329
 Thus, these separation-
 
 
REV. 309, 336 (2006) (describing the power to declare the law as a core judicial power); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Three Independences, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 611–12 (2004) (arguing that one of the 
three strands of judicial independence in the American tradition is the independence of thought, which 
includes the power of expounding the law). Some argue, however, that issues like the power to declare 
the law are more properly conceived of as separation-of-powers issues. See Thomas E. Plank, The 
Essential Elements of Judicial Independence and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1, 36–40 (1996) (noting that in American jurisprudence, the two issues, independence and 
separation of powers, tend to blend together).  
 324. See, e.g., Comm‘r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (holding that the federal 
courts are bound by the state-law opinions of the state supreme courts in Erie cases). 
 325. Indeed, this power is one the federal courts thought they held even in diversity suits. See 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 326. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 323 (discussing three strands of judicial independence in the 
American tradition: position, decision, and thought). 
 327. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 322, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 328. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (deploying this declaratory 
power to reign in unconstitutional congressional action). 
 329. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005) (―[T]he 
purpose of the diversity requirement . . . is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where 
state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.‖); see also Stephen C. 
Yeazell, Overhearing Part of a Conversation: Shutts as a Moment in a Long Dialogue, 74 UMKC L. 
REV. 779, 783 (2006) (presenting the anti-bias position as the traditional view of the purpose for 
diversity jurisdiction and critiquing it). 
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of-powers concerns vis-à-vis judicial independence are not as pressing 
here.  
B. Formalism and the Federal Question 
In addition to the insight that federal question jurisdiction requires 
judicial department declaratory authority, these cross-referential cases 
highlight the Court‘s proclivity toward formalism in its federal question 
jurisdiction doctrine. Whether the federal courts ought, across all contexts, 
to proceed in a formalist or functionalist manner is a long-standing debate 
among jurists.
330
 This general debate has found especial purchase in 
jurisdictional discussions as the Court ―indulges the old ‗habit‘ of legal 
formalism‖ often in its jurisdictional rulings.331 These cross-referential 
cases illustrate this old habit in spades. 
I follow Professor Idleman‘s jurisdiction-specific definitions of 
formalism and functionalism here.
332
 By formalism, then, I mean judicial 
reasoning that is especially structural and categorical in its jurisdictional 
analysis.
333
 Such an approach eschews balancing multiple interests on a 
case-by-case basis in determining whether jurisdiction lies in favor of 
holding that all suits bearing certain deductively determined attributes fall 
within the courts‘ jurisdictional scope. As a result, it is typically asserted 
that formalist jurisdictional decisions lead to bright line rules. 
Functionalist jurisdictional reasoning, by contrast, seeks to balance any 
number of case-specific factors in determining whether jurisdiction lies
334
 
(e.g., docket control, fairness to litigants, federalism concerns, 
congressional intent, as well as structural concerns). As such, functionalist 
jurisdictional opinions tend to be more pragmatic and circumstantial in 
 
 
 330. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 
SUP. CT. REV. 199, 201 (―Scholars and jurists have engaged in a long-standing debate concerning the 
general propriety of formalist and functionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation . . . .‖). 
 331. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 978 (2009); see also 
Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 132 (1998) (commenting upon an empirical study of jurisdictional opinions finding 
that the Court often falls into formalism); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging 
Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction After Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, 42 TULSA L. REV. 553, 570 
(2007) (describing the Court‘s jurisdictional holdings as increasingly formalist). 
 332. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 235, 344–45 (1999). There is also a rich literature on discussing formalism more generally. 
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 530 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999); Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent 
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). 
 333. Idleman, supra note 332, at 344. 
 334. Id. at 345. 
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focus,
335
 thus leading many to conclude that such rulings fail to create 
jurisdictional results that are cognizable ex ante.
336
 
To see this divide at work, I again turn to protective jurisdiction. Here, 
the Court has consistently rejected the legitimacy of protective jurisdiction 
on the grounds that such an approach runs contrary to federalism norms 
and the structure of Article III.
337
 As such, the Court will not take federal 
question jurisdiction over cases with mandatory cross-references to state-
law causes of action and rights.
338
 Assuming this position to be a sound 
one on the basis of avoiding the twin evils of undue dislodging of state law 
from the state courts and federal jurisdiction unmoored from Article III,
339
 
the Court should avoid those jurisdictional rulings that foster the same 
functional ills. 
On occasion, the Court does just that. For instance, the Court rejected 
Shoshone-style statutory federal question jurisdiction and offered dicta 
suggesting a rejection of Article III jurisdiction. Even though Shoshone-
style cases are formally distinct from protective jurisdiction insofar as 
these cases couple a federal cause of action with a mandatory cross-
reference to state-law rights, whereas protective jurisdiction mandatorily 
cross-references state-law causes of action as well,
340
 the Court‘s position 
makes sense on functionalist grounds, assuming protective jurisdiction is 
an illegitimate jurisdictional overreach. Recall that a cause of action is not, 
under contemporary doctrine, the same thing as a right.
341
 A cause of 
action is merely a statement saying that if a person‘s right has been 
infringed, the person may seek redress.
342
 A cause of action, then, does not 
speak to the substantive content of the right at issue; rather, it merely 
grants permission to sue to enforce rights created elsewhere.
343
 As such, all 
the supposed evils attaching to protective jurisdiction identified by Justice 
Frankfurter and others—federalism-based concerns regarding stripping 
 
 
 335. Id. 
 336. Contrary to the traditional view, there may be value in this uncertainty. See Scott Dodson, 
The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing that jurisdictional certainty 
is a goal that is both illusory and consistently overvalued normatively). 
 337. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing protective jurisdiction). 
 338. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 339. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing these banes). 
 340. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Shoshone-style jurisdiction). 
 341. See supra Part II.A (distinguishing rights and causes of action). 
 342. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(1) (2006) (―Every person that has furnished labor or material 
in carrying out work provided for in a contract for which a payment bond is furnished . . . and that has 
not been paid in full . . . may bring a civil action on the payment bond for the amount unpaid at the 
time the civil action is brought and may prosecute the action to final execution and judgment for the 
amount due.‖). 
 343. See supra Part II.A (distinguishing rights from causes of action). 
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state courts of interpretive power over state law,
344
 as well as structural 
concerns that protective jurisdiction renders Article III‘s limited delegation 
of jurisdiction to the federal courts meaningless
345—apply with equal force 
to taking jurisdiction over federal causes of action coupled with mandatory 
cross-references to state-law rights. If Congress can vest federal question 
jurisdiction over mandatory cross-references to state-law rights by merely 
enacting a cause of action (i.e., language such as ―persons not paid in full, 
contrary to the requirements of state contract law, may sue for 
damages‖),346 then Congress could simply strip the state courts of 
jurisdiction to hear nearly any state-law claim and render Article III 
toothless at will. The functional distinction between the Shoshone line of 
cases and protective jurisdiction is nil.
347
 
Professors Vázquez and Young have recently come to this same 
conclusion. Professor Vázquez argues that the distinction between 
protective jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction over mandatory cross-references to 
state-law causes of action and rights) and Shoshone-type cases (i.e., 
jurisdiction over federal causes of action coupled with mandatory cross-
references to state-law rights) is merely formal.
348
 As one who is otherwise 
an advocate of protective jurisdiction, he celebrates this result insofar as 
 
 
 344. Providing an exhaustive list of the scholarship here is impractical. So I merely reference 
Justice Frankfurter‘s classic position and Professor Young‘s recent additions. See, e.g., Textile 
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 475 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
protective jurisdiction indulges in an extraconstitutional distrust of state courts); Young, supra note 67, 
at 1793–1802 (providing two federalism-based rationales weighing against protective jurisdiction).  
 345. See, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 474 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Article III 
restrictions should not be so easily dismissed); Seinfeld, supra note 67, at 1445 (noting that many, 
although not the author, critique protective jurisdiction because it renders Article III ―toothless‖). 
 346. For an example of Congress using such language, one may refer to the Miller Act. See 40 
U.S.C. § 3133(b)(1); see also note 342. 
 347. Cf. Nat‘l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 594 n.22 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
plurality opinion) (―Moreover, the Tucker Act [like the FTCA referenced in the text of the opinion] 
simply opens those courts to plaintiffs already possessed of a cause of action. If that is sufficient to 
make the case one arising under the laws of the United States, the same is true of this suit and all 
others like it. No one urges that view of the present statute, nor could they.‖); id. at 598 n.23 (arguing 
that federal permission to enforce a state-law right is insufficient to vest federal question jurisdiction). 
Justice Jackson, in footnote 25 and the accompanying paragraph in text, erroneously relies upon cases 
interpreting the federal question statute, not Article III, in opining that Article III federal question 
jurisdiction was lacking in Tidewater. Nevertheless, I rely upon his notion in footnote 24 that such a 
view of Article III federal question jurisdiction would allow Congress to vest federal question 
jurisdiction merely upon ―open[ing] the courts,‖ id. at 594 n.22, i.e. passing a jurisdictional statute. 
That is to say, Justice Jackson equates this understanding of Article III federal question with protective 
jurisdiction. See supra Part III.A.1 (defining protective jurisdiction). Indeed, Professor Mishkin 
explicitly treats the Tidewater dissenters‘ view of Article III jurisdiction as a species of protective 
jurisdiction. See supra note 172. 
 348. Vázquez, supra note 20, at 1755 (arguing that despite the mere formal nature of the 
distinction, this ―formal‖ change is enough to vest Article III jurisdiction). 
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Congress can reach the functional equivalent of protective jurisdiction 
without running into an Article III stumbling block and, therefore, 
advocates limiting the Shoshone line of cases strictly to their holdings as 
interpretations of § 1331.
349
 Professor Young also agrees that Shoshone-
type cases are the functional equivalent to protective jurisdiction, but 
unlike Professor Vázquez, he finds this equivalence grounds for rejecting 
Shoshone-style jurisdiction on Article III grounds.
350
 This debate 
illustrates that, from a functionalist perspective, if one concludes with the 
Supreme Court that protective jurisdiction is beyond Article III‘s scope, 
then one should similarly conclude that Shoshone-style cases, with their 
attendant barrier to declaratory authority over the relevant substantive law, 
are as well.
351
 
Similarly, the Court has not let the formal aspects of enclave 
jurisdiction lead it to conflate that jurisdiction with protective jurisdiction. 
Indeed, these cases possess formal attributes much like protective 
jurisdiction (i.e., metadiscretionary cross-references to state-law causes of 
action and rights).
352
 Moreover, the rationale often given for taking federal 
question jurisdiction over state-law claims in federal enclaves is that 
―[b]ecause Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over federal 
enclaves—pieces of territory carved out of states for federal use and 
control—courts have reasoned that federal courts must also have subject 
matter jurisdiction over controversies that arise on such enclaves.‖353 The 
resemblance of this argument to Professor Welchsler‘s the-greater-power-
includes-the-lesser-power defense of protective jurisdiction is striking.
354
 
Nevertheless, the functional pitfalls of protective jurisdiction are not an 
issue in enclave jurisdiction because in the latter cases, the state ceded 
authority over the land at issue prior to the federal courts taking 
jurisdiction.
355
 Thus, federal question jurisdiction in enclave jurisdiction 
 
 
 349. Id.  
 350. Young, supra note 67, at 1802–04. 
 351. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of 
Article III, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1469 (2007) (―The Court might resist an attempt by Congress to 
address a lack of substance for federal question purposes simply by declaring that federal law 
incorporates state rules for decision. Mere incorporation of state law has a bootstrapping quality that 
makes it an unattractive vehicle for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction.‖); see also Goldberg-
Ambrose, supra note 67, at 558 (―Incorporation alone should not suffice, however, to fit the claim 
within a conventional interpretation of the arising under clause of article III because incorporation of 
state law does not generate any new independent federal rights or obligations.‖). 
 352. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing enclave jurisdiction). 
 353. Lawler v. Miratek Corp., No. EP-09-CV-252-KC, 2010 WL 743925, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 
2, 2010). 
 354. Wechsler, supra note 67, at 224–25. 
 355. See supra note 254 (discussing types of cessations of land). 
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cases is not stripping state courts of their jurisdiction as is supposed with 
protective jurisdiction, because enclaves are uniquely subject to 
congressional control.
356
 Rather, in these cases, it is the federal 
government delegating legislative authority to the state over the enclave.
357
 
But as often as not, the Court allows mere formal distinctions to vest 
federal question jurisdiction in the cross-referenced context. Such is the 
case when the federal common law metadiscretionarily cross-references 
state-law rights and the courts take federal question jurisdiction. The Court 
rightly (assuming protective jurisdiction beyond the pale) refuses federal 
question jurisdiction under Shoshone because the mere formal change of 
adding a federal cause of action to a mandatory cross-reference to state-
law rights is functionally equivalent to protective jurisdiction. Yet the 
Court allows claims with nearly the same formal structure, coupled with 
the same functional ills, to arise as federal questions when the federal 
common law metadiscretionarily cross-references state-law rights. Both 
require the federal court to apply the law of the forum state unless 
overridden by an overwhelming federal interest.
358
 Moreover, both are 
subject to similar federalism
359
 and structural concerns.
360
 Thus, from a 
 
 
 356. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (Congress is vested with general legislative power over the 
national capital and other land ceded by the States to the national government); U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 3, cl. 2 (Congress is vested with general legislative power over territory owned by the national 
government). 
 357. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the 
Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 249–50 (1997) (arguing that statutory cross-referencing to state 
law in the enclave context is best understood as congressional delegation of legislative authority). 
 358. Compare supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (discussing that mandatory cross-
references are subject to federal interest preemption), with Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 
U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (holding that forum state law applies in federal common law cases unless 
overridden by a strong showing of a unique federal interest). 
 359. Compare supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting federalism concerns in protective 
jurisdiction of stripping state courts of authority over state law), with Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 
218 (1997) (holding that because federal common law displaces state law, such issues properly are 
matters of congressional concern), and O‘Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83 (1994) 
(rejecting federal common law rule for attorney malpractice, inter alia, as it would ―divest[] States of 
authority over the entire law of imputation‖), and Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly 
Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 494–95 (2007) (―[C]onstitutional preemption is 
a component of almost all the federal common law decisions that displace state law with a judicially 
created alternative.‖), and Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 225, at 615 (―Federal common law 
displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of power from state to federal government.‖). 
 360. Compare supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting structural concerns in protective 
jurisdiction of overexpanding federal court jurisdiction), with Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither 
Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2001) (―The Constitution‘s provisions setting forth the 
procedures for enacting legislation impose numerous obstacles to the displacement of state law, chief 
among them the bicameralism and presentment requirements. These requirements protect state 
prerogatives because the states are represented in the legislative process. At the same time, they assure 
that the federal lawmaking branches will be accountable for any federal decision to displace state law. 
When the courts decide to displace state law on the basis of federal common law, the safeguards of the 
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functionalist view, if protective Shoshone-style jurisdiction is beyond the 
boundaries of federal question jurisdiction, then federal common law that 
deploys a metadiscretionary cross-reference to state law should be as 
well.
361
  
In fact, the only distinction between protective and Shoshone-style 
jurisdiction and federal common law suits coupled with a 
metadiscretionary cross-reference to state law is the identity of the agent 
limiting the discretion to deviate from the law of the forum state—
Congress in the former and the Court in the latter. The Court‘s 
unwillingness to allow federal question jurisdiction to arise in cases where 
Congress mandates a cross-reference to state-law rights (i.e., protective 
jurisdiction cases, Shoshone-style cases, FTCA cases, and pre-1974 cases 
under the Miller Act), but its willingness to vest jurisdiction when the 
Court mandates the functionally equivalent result as a matter of federal 
common law, raise significant separation-of-powers concerns.
362
 
The jurisdictional question forms the nub of this separation-of-powers 
difficulty. Absent some argument on the peripheries,
363
 jurists and scholars 
agree that the jurisdiction granted by Article III of the Constitution is not 
 
 
bicameralism and presentment requirements are circumvented and no political actors can easily be 
held accountable for the displacement.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
 361. See, e.g., John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes 
Outside Article III: A Critical Analysis from the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188, 
1220 (1993) (―In short, the theory of protective jurisdiction is little more than federal common law in 
disguise.‖); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 381 (1988) (―Justice Frankfurter‘s similar criticisms of both the federal common-law and 
protective jurisdiction theories indicates that it is not always easy to separate the two theories. Indeed, 
judicial reference to, or reliance on, nonfederal law in the creation of federal common-law causes of 
action differs little from the adoption of nonfederal causes of action under protective jurisdiction. 
Perhaps, then, the legitimacy of jurisdiction over federal common-law cases also supports judicial 
authority under the protective jurisdiction theory.‖ (footnotes omitted)). To be clear, I do not find this 
charge of formalism to carry the day in instances of federal common law in which the courts engage in 
discretionary cross-references to state law. See Young, supra note 50, at 1658 (arguing, based upon 
similar grounds, that federal common law should not lie when state law is cross-referenced in a 
metadiscretionary fashion). Nor do I find mandatory, or metadiscretionary, cross-references to state 
law inapt when jurisdiction does not rest on the existence of a federal question. See United States v. 
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (―The federal jurisdictional grant over suits 
brought by the United States is not in itself a mandate for applying federal law in all circumstances. 
This principle follows from Erie itself, where, although the federal courts had jurisdiction over 
diversity cases, we held that the federal courts did not possess the power to develop a concomitant 
body of general federal law.‖). 
 362. See Vázquez, supra note 20, at 1761 (―It would be odd to say that federal jurisdiction would 
exist when Congress delegates to the courts the power to preempt some state law, but not when 
Congress itself specifies the extent of preemption.‖). 
 363. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention at 
Guantánamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene v. Bush represents the first 
case to hold Congress constitutionally bound to vest lower court jurisdiction). 
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self-executing and that Congress retains near plenary power to vest the 
lower federal courts with as much or as little of that Article III power as it 
sees fit.
364
 Given that federal question jurisdiction ―masks a welter of 
issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the 
proper management of the federal judicial system,‖365 it makes sense that 
Congress renders these jurisdictional decisions because it is the 
preeminent actor in resolving federalism questions
366—at least in regard to 
 
 
 364. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (―[C]ommentators mark out their individual lines defining 
the precise scope of Congress‘s authority, but no one has challenged the central assumption that 
Congress bears primary responsibility for defining federal court jurisdiction.‖); Idleman, supra note 
332, at 241 (―For both constitutional and institutional reasons, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts is jealously guarded by its Article III keepers.‖); id. at 250–51 (―[T]he jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts does not flow directly from Article III; rather, the jurisdictional grants of Article 
III must be first affirmed by statute. . . . Congress—let alone the separation of powers—might be 
doubly offended by the unauthorized exercise of judicial power.‖ (footnotes omitted)); James Leonard, 
Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte 
Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 277 (2004) (―[T]he jurisdiction of the lower courts is a matter of 
legislative discretion and not of ‗need‘ defined from Article III.‖); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 83 (2d ed., The Michie 
Company 1990) (1980) (stating that federal courts can hear cases only if the Constitution has 
authorized courts to hear such cases and Congress has vested that power in federal courts); Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction 
of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1981) (―Courts and commentators agree that 
Congress‘ discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts implies that those courts take 
jurisdiction from Congress and not from article III.‖). Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction 
of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is 
found in Article III. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031 (1982) (espousing the traditional view that Congress is 
not required by Article III to vest full Constitutional subject matter jurisdiction in the inferior federal 
courts). Contra Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some of the 
Article III heads of jurisdiction in the federal judiciary); see Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional 
Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
129, 134 (1981) (arguing that there are non-Article III limits to Congress‘s discretion in vesting 
inferior federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction). Exercising this control over inferior courts, 
Congress withheld general federal question jurisdiction from them until 1875. See Judiciary Act of 
March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875); Randall, supra note 361, at 363, 365 n.76 (stating that the 
1875 Act was the first general congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction to the inferior 
federal courts and that it is the predecessor statute to § 1331, the current statutory grant of federal 
question jurisdiction). 
 365. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983); see also Merrell 
Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (―[D]eterminations about federal 
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal 
system.‖). 
 366. The classic example of so-called process federalism is Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954). See also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National 
Powers Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977) 
(arguing that the national political system protects states‘ interests in Congress and that the federal 
courts should focus on individual rights); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
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the intersection of federalism and the control of the federal courts‘ 
jurisdiction.
367
 As a result, the Court consistently holds that Congress is 
the better institution to make these judgments than are the federal 
courts.
368
 This institutional advantage flows from the fact that the states 
are represented there, the actors involved are politically accountable,
369
 
and the process for passing federal statutes offers several opportunities for 
the states to give input.
370
 
Federal common law, generally speaking, raises concerns in this 
regard. When a federal court creates both a right and a cause of action as a 
matter of federal common law, the court is simultaneously creating § 1331 
jurisdiction by crafting the very analytical components required to vest 
jurisdiction under the statute.
371
 Moreover, federal common law rights 
 
 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (arguing that separation-of-powers doctrine protects 
states‘ interest in Congress by rendering the passage of federal legislation difficult); Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 
(2000) (arguing that political parties adequately represent states‘ interests in Congress); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1476 (2007) 
(―[A]ssigning Congress primary control over interstate relations accords with precedent, federalism 
values, functional concerns, and history.‖); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2031 (2003) (―Congress can draw on its distinctive capacity 
democratically to elicit and articulate the nation‘s evolving constitutional aspirations when it enforces 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the institutionally specific ways that Congress can negotiate 
conflict and build consensus, it can enact statutes that are comprehensive and redistributive, and so 
vindicate constitutional values in ways that courts cannot.‖). Of course, process federalism has its 
critics. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2001) (arguing that process federalism does not 
adequately protect states‘ interests and thus the federal courts must play an active role in regard); 
Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating 
Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1815–44 (2005) (arguing that the federal courts have a 
primary role to play in questions of federalism doctrine). 
 367. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1969) (arguing that the Constitution places the 
power to ―expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts . . . specifically . . . in the Congress, not 
in the courts‖); Mishkin, supra note 19, at 159 (―[I]t is desirable that Congress be competent to bring 
to an initial national forum all cases in which the vindication of federal policy may be at stake.‖); 
Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 924, 1007 (2000) (―Rather than naturalizing a set of problems as intrinsically and 
always ‗federal [questions for jurisdictional purposes],‘ I urge an understanding of ‗the federal‘ as 
(almost) whatever Congress deems to be in need of national attention, be it kidnapping, alcohol 
consumption, bank robbery, fraud, or nondiscrimination.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 368. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (noting that since the states 
are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts, the presumption against displacement of state 
law is consistent with a presumption in favor of displacement of federal common law); Wallis v. Pan 
Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that ―[w]hether latent federal power should be 
exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,‖ not the federal courts). 
 369. Vázquez, supra note 360, at 1273. 
 370. Id. 
 371. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972) (federal common law claim 
constitutes ―a question arising under the ‗laws‘ of the United States‖); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 
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often
372
 preempt state law in some fashion,
373
 contrary to the view that 
such decisions are better left to Congress.
374
 Given these impediments, 
even if one concludes as I do that federal common law is a necessary 
element of our constitutional scheme,
375
 it pushes the boundaries of 
credulity to maintain that the courts can exercise this common law power 
 
 
225, at 653 (―[A] federal common law claim creates federal jurisdiction.‖); cf. Glen Staszewski, 
Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1035 (2006) (arguing, in regard to equal protection claims, that 
recognizing certain ―actionable federal constitutional claims would dramatically expand the 
jurisdiction of federal courts‖). Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal 
courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is found in Article III. See 
supra note 364 (discussing how Congress retains power to vest the lower federal courts with as much 
or as little of the federal jurisdiction that is granted by Article III).  
 372. Federal common law may at times be made for the purpose of giving effect to a federal 
statute when there is no otherwise applicable state law that is displaced. See, e.g., Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (holding that the Taft-Hartley Act gave federal 
courts jurisdiction to hear controversies involving labor contracts and authorized federal courts to 
make a body of federal law for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.). Or, at times, federal 
common law may explicitly adopt the law of the state as the federal rule, displacing state law only in a 
nominal sense. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98–99 (1991) (holding that 
the law of the state of incorporation applied to a derivative action brought under the Investment 
Company Act). Another instance lies in the federal common law of Indian relations. In the case of 
Indian law, the field is so dominated by federal law that there is no state law to displace. See, e.g., 
Nat‘l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850–53 (1985) (discussing the 
plenary power of the federal government over Indian tribes). 
 373. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (holding that because federal common 
law displaces state law, such issues properly are matters of congressional concern); O‘Melveny & 
Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83 (1994) (rejecting federal common law rule for attorney malpractice, 
inter alia, as it would ―divest[] States of authority over the entire law of imputation‖); see also Boyle 
v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (―[A] few areas, involving ‗uniquely federal 
interests,‘ are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United states to federal control that 
state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent 
explicit statutory directive) by the courts—so-called ‗federal common law.‘‖ (citation omitted)); 
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (―This Court has consistently held that 
federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide 
federal programs.‖); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) (―We conclude 
that the scope of the act of state doctrine must be determined according to federal law.‖); Rosen, supra 
note 359, at 494–95 (―[C]onstitutional preemption is a component of almost all the federal common 
law decisions that displace state law with a judicially created alternative.‖); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra 
note 225, at 615 (―Federal common law displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of power from 
state to federal government.‖). 
 374. See Redish, supra note 238, at 766–67 (arguing that federal common law, as it is essentially a 
legislative function, violates separation-of-powers principles). 
 375. See D‘Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(―Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the 
recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of the 
Constitution itself.‖); Monaghan, supra note 238, at 14 (―[T]he authority to create federal common law 
springs of necessity from the structure of the Constitution, from its basic division of authority between 
the national government and the states.‖); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of 
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 (1985) (discussing how the Court will exercise legislative 
power at times due to our complex constitutional scheme). For a contrary view, see Redish, supra note 
238, at 766–67 (arguing that federal common law, as it is essentially a legislative function, violates 
separation-of-powers principles). 
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functionally to mandate cross-references to state-law rights when that 
power is denied to Congress.
376
 If Congress cannot couple a federal cause 
of action to a mandatory cross-reference to state-law rights,
377
 then the 
Court should not be empowered to produce the functional equivalent on its 
own as a matter of federal common law causes of action coupled with 
metadiscretionary cross-references to state law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I contend that the federal courts take federal question 
jurisdiction over cross-referenced law only when the force of the cross-
reference affords the federal court declaratory authority over the law in 
question. After testing this proposition from numerous angles, I contend 
that these somewhat esoteric cases provide the following valuable insights 
into the nature of federal question jurisdiction. First, the Court links 
declaratory power in federal question cases to notions of judicial 
independence. As a result, the notion that one of the core values of federal 
question jurisdiction is to serve as a mere fact finder requires retooling. 
Second, the courts‘ efforts to preserve declaratory power, unfortunately, 
often rely upon mere differences in form to vest federal question 
jurisdiction over matters that appear functionally equivalent to protective 
jurisdiction. The courts would be better served, and would avoid the 
significant separation-of-powers concern outlined previously, if they 
approached cross-referenced regimes functionally. 
 
 
 376. See Young, supra note 50, at 1664–67 (rejecting the notion that the Court may impose 
metadiscretionary cross-references to forum state law in favor of a view requiring federal common law 
to cross-reference state law only in a discretionary manner). 
 377. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Shoshone line of cases). 
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